Western New England Law Review
Volume 7 7 (1984-1985)
Issue 3

Article 8

1-1-1985

FINANCIAL AND TAX ACCOUNTING FOR
COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Robert W. McGee

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Robert W. McGee, FINANCIAL AND TAX ACCOUNTING FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE, 7 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 651 (1985),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol7/iss3/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

FINANCIAL AND TAX ACCOUNTING FOR
COMPUTER SOFTWARE
ROBERT

W.

MCGEE·

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . • • • . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . • • . . . • . • . . .

The Beginning of the Problem: How to Account for
Software .........................................
B. What is Software. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. The Tangibility Issue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Financial Accounting Rules .......................

652

A.

II.

DEFICIENCIES IN CURRENT PRONOUNCEMENTS. . . . . . . •

FASB Statement No.2............................
B. FASB Interpretation No.6. ........................
C. Technical Bulletin No. 79-2 .......................
A.

III.

RELATED PRONOUNCEMENTS. . . . • . . .. . . . . .. . . .. • . . .. .

A. The Record and Music Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Motion Picture Films..............................
C. Research and Development Agreements ............
IV.

657
661
662
662
662

664
665

SOFTWARE COSTS: SHOULD THEY BE CAPITALIZED OR
EXPENSED? . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . • • • • . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . • • • . . • . .

A.
B.
V.

653
654
655
656
657

The Controversy ..................................
The Catalyst. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

AUTHOR'S VIEWS. . • . • • . • . • • . . . • • . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . • . . . . •

A. Amortization.....................................
B. Investment Tax Credit ............................
C. Sales/Use Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

666
667
668
668

673
673
673

• Manager, Accounting Practices, National Association of Accountants; Associate
Professor of Accounting and Taxation, W. Paul Stillman School of Business, Seton Hall
University. B.A., Gannon University, 1969; M.S.T., Taxation, De Paul University, 1976;
J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University, 1980. Certified Pub
lic Accountant, Ohio, 1978, New Jersey, 1982; Certified Management Accountant, 1979;
Chartered Bank Auditor, 1982; Certified Internal Auditor, 1983; Certified Cost Analyst,
1984; Certified Systems Professional, 1984. Mr. McGee is the author, co-author, or editor
of 14 books and over 60 articles. His research was funded by the National Association of
Accountants and was used to partially fulfill the Ph.D requirements at the University of
Warwick, Coventry, England.

651

652

VI.

VII.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:651

D. Property Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E. Different Accounting Treatments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
STATE TAXATION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE..........
A. Tangibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Case Law in Related Areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Software Tax Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. 1983: A Turning Point or an Aberration? ........ . .
FEDERAL TAXATION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE.......
A. The Investment Tax Credit........................
B. The Credit for Research and Experimental
Expenditures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. A Controversy....................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Congressional Intent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E. Treasury Department Misinterpretation. . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.

673
674
674
674
676
679
685

691
691
699
701
702
702

INTRODUCTION

In the decade following World War II companies began to drasti
cally increase their use of computers to solve business problems and to
process data. At this early stage in the development of the computer
industry, the companies that manufactured computer hardware also
produced the software that was used with the machines. These manu
facturers generally sold the systems software as part of the hardware
without breaking down the purchase price into its hardware and
software components. 1 The companies that used the hardware hired
employees to construct any necessary "custom" software. Few com
panies constructed systems or applications software for sale apart from
sales that were "bundled" with hardware.
As the use of computers became more prevalent in the 1960s, the
demand for custom programming increased and led to the develop
ment of a new industry that would supply these software users with
the programs they needed .. It was still not a common practice, how
ever, to purchase application programs because they were supplied
free of charge by the hardware manufacturer.
In June, 1969, the policy of bundling hardware and software costs
changed when IBM decided to "unbundle," or state the cost of their
hardware and software separately.2 This policy resulted in the crea
1. For a discussion of computer software sales see Gordon & Starr, Software Develop
ment Contracts and Consulting Arrangements: A Structure for Enforceability and Practical
ity, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 487 (1985).
2. The decision to "unbundle" was made in part for antitrust reasons. See Schmedel,
IBM Discloses Its Long Awaited Plan for Separating Its Computer and Services Prices, Wall
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tion of the computer software industry. Its members began to produce
software for sale to users of hardware. Companies that formerly wrote
their own software were given the option of purchasing software. This
option became very attractive. The costs of developing a program
might exceed six figures, whereas a comparable program could be
purchased for under $50,000. This cost relationship led to a rapid in
crease in the number of firms that manufacture software for sale. A
program that might cost $1 million to construct could be sold to a
multitude of customers for $50,000 each. A software firm would,
therefore, be able to break even after only twenty sales. Any addi
tional sales would be almost pure profit because the cost of delivering a
program is basically equal to the cost of the medium used (tape, disk,
etc.) plus selling expenses.
A.

The Beginning of the Problem: How to Account for Software

In the same year that IBM decided to unbundle, the Internal
Revenue Service issued a pronouncement addressing the software is
sue. 3 This Revenue Procedure provided tax accounting guidelines in
connection with costs incurred to develop, purchase, or lease com
puter software. This procedure basically stated that the costs associ
ated with the development of software could be either expensed as
incurred or capitalized and amortized over five years or less. Thus,
software development costs were to be accorded the same treatment as
research and development costs for federal tax purposes. 4
Purchased software, if bundled, could be capitalized along with
the hardware. Software having a separately stated price could be am
ortized if treated as an intangible asset. Leased software is accorded
the same treatment as rentals under regulation 1.162-11.5
Two years after that pronouncement was issued, the Internal
Revenue Service issued a second pronouncement dealing with
software. 6 That ruling held that for depreciation and investment tax
credit purposes, the cost of a new computer includes software costs
not separately stated and capitalized in accordance with the taxpayer's
St. J., June 24, 1969, at 38 col. I; Goetz, When IBM Unbundled, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec.
31, I 979/Jan. 7, 1980, at 35; Goetz, Unbundling: Will 80's Repeat the 60's?, CoM
PUTERWORLD, April 14, 1980, at 33; Note, The Revolt Against the Property Tax on
Software: an Unnecessary Conflict Growing Out of Unbundling, 9 SUFFOLK U. L. REv.,
118,124 (1974).
3. Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303.
4. Id. Section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code permits expensing or amortization
of research and development costs at the taxpayer's option. I.R.C. § 174 (2)(b) (1976).
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-11 (1978).
6. Rev. Rul. 71-177, 1971-1 C.B. 5.
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consistent practice. Another pronouncement issued that same year
held that the capitalization of software costs with respect to a new
computer, if such costs had previously been expensed, is a change in
accounting method and requires the Commissioner's consent. 7

B.

What is Software?

Prior to June, 1969, when IBM unbundled and created the
software industry, it was unnecessary to define software for accounting
purposes. Software was accounted for as part of the hardware. The
few programs that were developed internally constituted such a small
percentage of the total expenditures for most companies that a formal
software accounting policy was not necessary.
As software expenditures continued to increase and become more
material, however, companies began to establish specific policies for
software accounting. The definition of software then became impor
tant. Unfortunately, there is no single readily accepted definition of
software. The broadest definition would be that software includes
everything that is not hardware. 8 The definition of software promul
gated by the National Bureau of Standards9 and adopted by the U.S.
Bureau of Standards is: "Computer programs, procedures, rules, and
possibly associated documentation concerned with the operation of a
data processing system."l0
The Internal Revenue Service defines computer software as:
[A]ll programs or routines used to cause a computer to perform a
desired task or set of tasks, and the documentation required to de
scribe and maintain those programs. Computer programs of all
classes, for example, operating systems, exceutive [sic] systems
monitors, compilers and translators, assembly routines, and utility
programs as well as application programs are included. "Computer
software" does not include procedures which are external to com
puter operations, such as instructions to transcription operators and
external control procedures. I I

Several courts and state legislatures have also defined software.
Some have even drawn distinctions between systems software and ap
plications software. The Supreme Court of Tennessee, for instance,
7. Rev. Rul. 71-248, 1971-1 C.B. 55.
8. See Software Industry Analysis, CoMPUTER YEARBOOK 98 (1972).
9. American National Dictionary for Information Processing, American Standards
Committee X3 Technical Report 1-77.
to. Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 11-1, September 30, 1977.
11. Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303.
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has defined a systems (operational) program as one that is fundamen
tal to the functioning of the hardware, or software that controls the
hardware and makes it run.12
John W. Bryant and Lance R. Mather state that systems software
consists of:
compliers, which are used to translate symbolic code into
machine language and which are also capable of replacing a series of
instructions with subroutines;
2. sorts, which assemble and file items of data in a certain se
quence or order; and
3. utility routines, which perform functions such as transferring
data from one magnetic tape to another. 13
1.

C.

The Tangibility Issue

Another problem created by unbundling is the issue of tangibility.
The Internal Revenue Service treats software as intangible and there
fore not eligible for the investment tax credit unless bundled with
hardware. 14 At least one court has ruled, however, that software is
tangible and qualifies for the investment tax credit. IS For state sales,16
use,17 and propertyl8 tax purposes, the majority of courts have held
that software is intangible and therefore not subject to the tax. Two
recent cases, however, have held otherwise. 19 For Uniform Commer
12. Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405,406 (Tenn. 1976); see also,
Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Department of Assessments and Tax'n, 271 Md. 674,
320 A.2d 52 (1974).
13. Bryant & Mather, Property Taxation a/Computer So/tware. 18 N.Y.L.F. 59,62
(1972).
14. Rev. Rul. 71-177, 1971-1 C.B. 5.
15. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States, 407 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Tex. 1976),
rev 'd. 551 F.2d 599,611 (5th Cir. 1977).
16. County of Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. App.3d 654,108 Cal.
Rptr. 434 (1973); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976); Bul
lock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166 (Texas 1977); First Nat'l Bank of Fort
Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Janesville Data Center, Inc. v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 84 Wis.2d 341, 267 N.W.2d 656 (1978).
17. State v. Central Computer Services, Inc., 349 S.2d 1160 (1977); First Nat'l Bank
of Springfield v. Department of Revenue. 85 m.2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981); Quotron Sys.
v. Comptroller. 287 Md. 178.411 A.2d 439 (1980); James v. Tres Computer Sys., Inc., 642
S.W.2d 347 (Mo. banc 1982).
18. District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Honeywell Information Sys.• Inc. v. Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 171,575 P.2d
801 (1978); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Department of Assessments and Tax'n,
271 Md. 674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974).
19. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248
(1983) (the sale of software constitutes the sale of tangible personal property subject to the
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cial Code20 and replevin21 purposes, software is tangible, but it is not
tangible for collapsible corporation purposes. 22 The sale of a prewrit
ten program is currently taxable in thirty-three states 23 and exempt in
thirteen,24 with a few states not yet taking a position orie way or the
other.25
D.

Financial Accounting Rules

The present financial accounting rules pertaining to computer
software are unclear. The Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) has issued several pronouncements that deal to a limited ex
tent with software. One pronouncement26 requires that research and
. development costs be expensed as incurred, unless there exists an al
ternative future use for the software. Another pronouncement27 states
that not all software costs are to be considered research and develop
ment costs. A third pronouncement28 asserts that software costs not
qualifying as research and development expenditures are not necessar
ily inventoriable or deferrable. None of the FASB pronouncements
Maryland sales tax); Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983)
(software is tangible and subject to the Vennont use tax).
20. Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F.Supp. 738,742-43
(D.N.J. 1979), affd, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); cf Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Hon
eywell, Inc., 457 F.Supp. 765,769 (E.D. N.Y. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 604 F.2d 737
(2d Cir. 1979)(though intangible, software is more readily characterized as "goods" than
"services" and, therefore, the sale of software is governed by the code); see Carl Beasley
Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F.Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973), affd 493 F.2d 1400 (3d
Cir. 1974).
21. F & M Schaefer Corp. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 430 F.Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), affd 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979).
22. Computer Sciences Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 63 T.C.
327,346-47 (1974).
23. The sale of a prewritten program is currently taxable in Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massa
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Caro
lina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vennont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
24. The sale of a prewritten program is currently exempt from taxation in Alabama,
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Texas, and the District of Columbia.
25. Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon have not, at the time
of this writing, taken a position on whether the sale of a prewritten program is taxable or
exempt from taxation.
26. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement ofFinancial Accounting Stan
dards No.2, "Accounting for Research and Development Costs" (1974).
27. Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB Interpretation No.6, "Applicabil
ity of FASB Statement No.2 to Computer Software" (1975).
28. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Technical Bulletin 79-2. "Computer
Software Costs" (1979).
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clearly detail when computer software qualifies for capitalization treat
ment. Furthermore, it is unclear whether software costs should be in
cluded in the balance sheet as tangible or intangible assets, although
FASB Interpretation No.6, paragraph 8, footnote 2 seems to indicate
that software should be classified as intangible. 29
The Accounting Principles Board, the predecessor of the Finan
cial Accounting Standards Board, has issued a pronouncement30 re
quiring that intangibles acquired from others be recorded as assets and
amortized using the straight-line method (unless some other method is
more appropriate). That opinion also states that the cost of develop
ing intangibles that are not specifically identifiable should be expensed
as incurred. The issue of how to account for identifiable, internally
developed intangibles is not addressed. It is questionable whether
computer software should be classified as intangible in any event, since
the courts seem unable to agree on the tangibility of software.

II.
A.

DEFICIENCIES IN CURRENT PRONOUNCEMENTS

FASB Statement No.2

The FASB research and development statement 31 provides as
much ambiguity as it provides guidance. For instance, paragraph 8(a)
defines research as "planned search or critical investigation aimed at
discovery of new knowledge with the hope that such knowledge will be
useful in developing a new product or service or a new process or tech
nique or in bringing about a significant improvement to an existing
product or process."32
Research is an activity that occurs relatively early in the software
construction process. Although FASB Statement No.2 requires that
research expenditures be charged to expense as incurred, there is little
guidance regarding which activities should be classified as research.
Paragraph 8(b) defines development as follows:
[T]he translation of research findings or other knowledge into a plan
or design for a new product or process or for a significant improve
29. At least two federal agencies permit the capitalization of software under certain
circumstances. See United States General Accounting Office, Illustrative Accounting Proce
dures/or Federal Agencies: Guidelines/or Automatic Data Processing Costs, (Federal Gov
ernment Accounting Pamphlet No.4, GAO, 1978); see also Interstate Commerce
Commission, Accounting Series Circulation No. 194, September 17, 1982, which is dis
cussed in Motor Freight Controller, December, 1982, at 14.
30. Accounting Principles Board, APB Opinion No. 17, "Intangible Assets," (1970).
31. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement 0/ Financial Accounting Stan
dards No.2, "Accounting for Research and Development Costs" (1974).
32. Id.
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ment to an existing product or process whether intended for sale or
use. It includes the conceptual formulation, design, and testing of
product alternatives, construction of prototypes, and operation of
pilot plants. It does not include routine or periodic alterations to
existing products, production lines, manufacturing processes, and
other ongoing operations even though those alterations may repre
sent improvements and it does not include market research or mar
ket testing activities. 33

This definition of development can be applied to software accounting
in two distinct ways. First, it can be interpreted to mean that the de
velopment phase does not end until software construction is essentially
complete, because successful completion is uncertain until the devel
opment process is nearly complete. For the development phase to end
it is necessary to have a working prototype. The fact that design mod
ifications are necessary throughout the construction phase is evidence
that development occurs through that phase.
Second, it can be interpreted that the development phase has es
sentially been completed before the construction phase begins. Under
this interpretation, any design modifications that occur during con
struction are minor in nature, and are not· part of the development
phase. The formulation, design, and product testing activities occur
prior to the construction phase. In fact, there must be a single proquct
design before construction can commence. Although testing occurs
during the construction phase, the testing at that stage involves the
product's operation rather than the testing of alternative products.
Furthermore, the software construction process does not culminate in
the production of a prototype or the operation of a pilot plant. These
guidelines are therefore irrelevant for purposes of determining the end
of the development phase and the beginning of the production phase.
The key point for determining the end of the development phase
should instead be the establishment of technological feasibility.
Paragraph 31 states:
Computer software is developed for many and diverse uses.
Accordingly, in each case the nature of the activity for which the
software is being developed should be considered in relation to the
guidelines in paragraphs 8-10 to determine whether software costs
should be included or excluded. For example, efforts to develop a
new or higher level of computer software capability intended for
sale (but not under a contractual arrangement) would be a research
33. Id.
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and development activity encompassed by this statement. 34

The term "new" or higher level of computer software capability
lends itself to multiple interpretations. If "new" is interpreted in the
technological sense, most software would be excluded because most
software is developed using existing rather than new technology.
"New" may also be interpreted to mean new in the market sense. For
example, the first company to develop and market a payroll program
incurs development costs, but companies that subsequently develop a
similar product do not incur development costs.
The term "efforts to develop" may also be interpreted in at least
two ways. It could be interpreted to include the whole construction
process, which would place all construction expenditures in the devel
opment phase. It could also be interpreted to mean that "efforts to
develop" cease prior to the construction phase. These interpretations
obviously lead to opposite results, as construction expenditures would
be classified as development costs calling for expense treatment in the
first instance. Such expenditures would be nonresearch and develop
ment costs in the second instance, and might call for capitalization
treatment instead.
Paragraph 9 of FASB Statement No.2 provides several examples
of activities that could be considered research and development
expenditures:
(a) Laboratory research aimed at discovery of new knowledge.
(b) Searching for applications of new research findings or other
knowledge.
(c) Conceptual formulation and design of possible product or pro
cess alternatives.
(d) Testing in search for or evaluation of product or process
alternatives.
(e) Modification of the formulation or design of a product or
process.
(f) Design, construction, and testing of pre-production prototypes
and models.
(g) Design of tools, jigs, molds, and dies involving new technology.
(h) Design, construction, and operation of a pilot plant that is not
of a scale economically feasible to the enterprise for commercial
production.
(i) Engineering activity required to advance the design of a product
to the point that it meets specific functional and economic re
quirements and is ready for manufacture. 35
34. Id.
35. Id.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

660

[Vol. 7:651

Activities (a) through (d) generally occur prior to the construc
tion phase. Example (e), "modification of the formulation or design
of a product or process," can occur throughout the process, but occurs
only to a minimal degree once the construction process begins. Design
modifications can be viewed as part of the development phase or as
part of the construction phase after development is completed.
Examples (t) through (h) are viewed by some as not being appli
cable to software accounting. The end product is not a prototype, but
rather is the product itself. Others view the prototype as being the end
product itself in the case of software, which would place the entire
software construction process within the definition of research and de
velopment and therefore subject to expense treatment.
The last example relates to engineering activity. One view holds
that manufacturing is merely the duplication of the program once the
program is ready to market, and that all activity occurring prior to
this point is research and development. Others view all engineering
activity as occurring prior to construction.
Paragraph 10 lists examples of activities that typically would be
excluded from research and development. These activities include:
(a) Engineering follow-through in an early phase of commercial
production.
(b) Quality control during commercial production including rou
tine testing of products.
(c) Trouble-shooting in connection with break-downs during com
mercial production.
(d) Routine, on-going efforts to refine, enrich, or otherwise improve
upon the qualities of an existing product.
(e) Adaptation of an existing capability to a particular requirement
or customer's need as part of a continuing commercial activity.
(t) Seasonal or other periodic design changes to existing products.
(g) Routine design of tools, jigs, molds and dies.
(h) Activity, including design and construction engineering, related
to the construction, relocation, rearrangement, or start-up of fa
cilities or equipment other than (1) pilot plants ... and (2)
facilities or equipment whose sole use is for a particular re
search and development project. . . .
(i) Legal work in connection with patent applications or litigation,
and the sale or licensing of patents. 36
The first three examples are subject to several interpretations.
These activities could be viewed as occurring only after sales have
36.

Id.
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commenced, and that similar activities that occur during construction
are part of development. Another view is that these activities consti
tute construction and post construction activities, which indicates that
construction costs should not be considered part of development.
B.

FASB Interpretation No.6

Another FASB pronouncement states that "[o]ther costs, includ
ing those incurred for programming and testing software, are research
and development costs when incurred in the search for or the evalua
tion of product or process alternatives or in the design of a pre-produc
tion model. "37
The phrase "search for or the evaluation of product or process
alternatives" is subject to varying interpretations depending on
whether development is regarded as being virtually complete at the
beginning of construction or at the end. The term "preproduction
model" is undefined and its meaning, as it applies to software, remains
unclear. The preproduction model can be interpreted to be synony
mous with prototype. Under such an interpretation, all costs incurred
prior to the completion of the prototype can be viewed as research and
development costs. Another view is that preproduction models are
not made for software, although systems makeups or product simula
tors are sometimes made prior to construction.
The FASB pronouncement further states "costs for programming
and testing are not research and development costs when incurred, for
example, in routine or other on-going efforts to improve an existing
product or adapt a product . . . to a particular requirement or cus
tomer's need. "38
This statement can be interpreted to mean that programming and
testing costs are not research and development expenditures only
when they are incurred to improve an existing product or adapt a
product to a particUlar requirement or customer's need. Alternatively,
it can be interpreted to exclude programming and testing costs from
classification as research and development for activities other than
those given in the example. Furthermore, it can be argued that zero
ing in on the costs associated with product improvement or adaptation
misses the point entirely, and that the issue to be addressed should be
accounting for construction costs. Lastly, one could conclude by a
literal reading of the interpretation that all enhancement costs should
37. Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB Interpretation No.6, "Applicabil
ity of FASB Statement No.2 to Computer Software" (1975).
38. Id.
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be classified as nonresearch and development. It can be argued, how
ever, that such a view is unreasonable. The process involved in pro
ducing enhancements to an existing product is essentially the same as
that for a new product. Some of the costs involved in the construction
of a new product are research and development costs.
C.

Technical Bulletin No. 79-2
Technical Bulletin No. 79-2 states:
[A]ll costs incurred in producing a given software product or pro
cess are not necessarily research and development costs. However,
a determination that software production costs are not research and
development costs does not necessarily mean that they would be
inventoriable or deferrable to future operations. Those decisions
can only be made in light of all the facts and circumstances sur
rounding the particular situation. 39

One may conclude from the pronouncement above that little, if
any, guidance is provided. The issue of research and development cost
classification is not addressed. Although there is a hint that certain
costs may be deferrable or inventoriable under certain circumstances,
the pronouncement fails to elaborate when such circumstances might
arise.

III.
A.

RELATED PRONOUNCEMENTS

The Record and Music Industry

It may be argued that the cost of producing a record master is
similar to the cost of producing a computer program. In both cases:
1.
2.

3.
4.

The majority of the product's value is the result of the labor
that is expended rather than the material that is used;
logical patterns must be developed (coding or music, either in
written or nonwritten form) and transferred onto a physical me
dium such as a record, tape, or disk (although this is not neces
sarily the case for a computer program, which may be input
directly into the computer);
the value of the finished product far exceeds the value of the
material upon which the coding or music is recorded; and
both records and computer programs developed for sale have
estimated economic lives and projected income streams that are
difficult but not impossible to predict.

39. Financial Accounting Standards Board. Technical Bulletin No. 79-2. "Computer
Software Costs" (1979).
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, The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copy
righted Works states "[b]oth recorded music and computer programs
are sets of information in a form which, when passed over a magne
tized head, cause minute currents to flow in such a way that desired
physical work is accomplished."4O
On the other hand, it may be argued that records differ from com
puter programs that are recorded on disks or tapes. 41 For example,
when information is transferred from a tape into the computer, the
tape is often not even retained by the user. It may be discarded or
returned. The information on the tape, unlike a phonograph record, is
not complete and ready to be used at the time of its purchase. It must
be translated into a language that is understood by the computer. Fur
thermore, a computer tape or disk is not necessary to transmit infor
mation. Such information can be sent over telephone wires or by
satellite. It may even be programmed directly by the originator of the
program.,
In 1981, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued a
Statement that permits the capitalization of a record master under cir
cumstances in which past performance and the artist's current popu
larity provide a sound basis for estimating that the cost will be
recovered from future sales:
The portion of the cost of a record master born by the record
company shall be reported as an asset if the past performance and
current popularity of the artist provides a sound basis for estimating
that the cost shall be charged to expense. The amount recognized
as an asset shall be amortized over the estimated life of the recorded
performance using a method that reasonably relates the amount to
the net revenue expeCted to' be realized. 42
'
40. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 10 (l978)(hereinafter CONTU REPORT). For a discussion
of CONTU and the CONTU REPORT see generally Stem, Section 117 ofthe Copyright Act:
Charter ofthe Software Users' Rights or an Illusory Promise?, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 459
(1985). See also Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 464
A.2d 248 (1983); James v. Tres Computer Sys., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 347, 351-53 (Mo. banc
1982)(Rendlen, J., dissenting).
41. See Heinzman, Computer Software: Should It Be Treated As Tangible Property
for Ad Valorem Tax?, J. TAX'N 184,184-186 (1972); District of Columbia v. Universal
Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615,617-20 (D.c. Cir. 1972); James v. Tres Computer
Sys., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 347,348-50 (Mo. 1982); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538
S.W.2d 405,407-08 (Tenn. 1976).
42. Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB Statement No. 50, "Financial Re
porting in the Record and Music Industry" (1981). See also American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Statement of Position 76-1, "Accounting Practices in the Record and
Music Industry" (1976).
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The Financial Accounting Standards board offered the following defi
nition of record master:
The master tape resulting from the performance of the artist.
It is used to produce molds for commercial record production and

other tapes for use in making cartridges, cassettes, and reel tapes.
the costs of producing a record master include (a) the cost of the
musical talent (musicians, vocal background, and arrangements);
(b) the cost of the technical talent for engineering, directing, and
mixing; (c) costs for the use of the equipment to record and produce
the master; and (d) studio facility charges. . . . 43

In its comment letter to the Exposure Draft that eventually be
came Statement No. 50, Coopers & Lybrand suggested that the lan
guage of the Statement be changed to specifically include Publishers of
Music. 44 Similarly, other respondents45 suggested including record
producers and song writers46 within the language of the Statement.
B.

Motion Picture Films

Another Statement that might be related to computer software
costs is FASB Statement No. 53, "Financial reporting by Producers
and Distributors of Motion Picture Films."47 It allows the capitaliza
tion of film production costs and requires such costs to be capitalized
as film cost inventory and to be amortized using the individual-film
forecast-computation method48 or the periodic-table-computation
method. 49 The individual-film-forecast-computation method amor
tizes costs in the ratio of current gross revenues to anticipated total
gross revenues, with adjustment for periodic changes in estimate. 50
43. FASB Statement No. 50, supra note 42.
44. Letter from Coopers & Lybrand to Director of Research and Technical Activi
ties, Financial Accounting Standards Board (Sept. II, 1981).
45. See Letter from New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants to Di
rector of Research and Technical Activities, Financial Accounting Standards Board (Aug.
27, 1981)(File Ref. No. 1063-077); Letter from American Institute of Certified Public Ac
countants to Mr. Michael O. Alexander, Director of Research and Technical Activities,
Financial Accounting Standards Board (Oct. IS, 1981)(File Ref. No. 1063-077).
46. Letter from Arthur Andersen & Co. to Director of Research and Technical Ac
tivities, Financial Accounting Standan;ls Board, (Sept. 21, 1981); Letter from Arthur
Young & Co. to Michael O. Alexander, Director of Research and Technical Activities,
Financial Accounting Standards Board (Sept. 21, 1981).
47. See Industry Accounting Guide, "Accounting for Motion Picture Films" (1973);
Statement of Position 79-4, "Accounting for Motion Picture Films" (1979).
48. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement ofFinancial Accounting Stan
dards No. 53, "Financial Reporting in the Record and Music Industry" (1981).
49. Id. at paragraphs 10 and 13.
50. Id. at paragraph 12.
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The periodic-table-computation method amortizes film costs using the
historic revenue patterns of a large group of films.51
The analogy of motion picture films to software has been sug
gested in several court cases. Furthermore, several court cases dealing
with sales, use, property, or federal taxation of motion picture films or
master negatives52 have been cited by courts hearing software tax
issues. 53
C.

Research and Development Arrangements

Another F ASB Statement 54 addresses the topic of research and
development arrangements. During the course of several interviews
conducted as part of this research project, it was suggested that some
software vending companies enter into research and development ar
rangements in order to treat costs that would otherwise be expensed as
assets. These arrangements may be structured so that a separate entity
undertakes the task of constructing software that would otherwise be
constructed internally. The separate entity then sells the finished
51. In its comment letter to the Exposure Draft of Statement No. 50 (dated Aug. 27,
1981) (File Ref. No. 1063-074), the New York State Society of Certified Public Account
ants recommended that reference to the periodic-table-computation be deleted because the
film industry generally follows the individual film forecast method on a film-by-film basis.
The letter also points out that other methods can always be used as long as the result would
not be materially different, and any reference to other methods would only add confusion.
Arthur Young & Co. made a similar comment (letter dated Sept. 21, 1981), as did the
Accounting Standards Division of the AICPA (letter dated Nov. 13, 1981). Several re
spondents to the Exposure Draft also mentioned that reference should be made to interest
capitalization costs.
Even though the periodic-table-computation method might not be the most widely
used method in the film industry, it might find acceptance in the software industry because
a larger variety of products are produced in the latter industry.
52. See Bing Crosby Productions, Inc. v. United States, 588 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir.
1979); Walt Disney Productions v. United States (Disney I), 327 F. Supp. 189 (C.D. Cal.
1971), modified, 480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 93 (1974); Walt Disney
Productions V. United States (Disney III), 549 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1977); Boswell V. Para
mount Television Sales, Inc., 291 Ala. 490, 282 So.2d 892 (1973); see also Florida Associa
tion of Broadcasters V. Kirk, 264 So.2d 437, cert. denied, 268 So.2d 534 (1972); Crescent
Amusement Co. V. Carson, 187 Tenn. 112, 213 S.W.2d 27 (1948); In re Merrill Theatre
Corp. Sales and Use Tax, 138 Vt. 397,415 A.2d 1327 (1980); Mount Mansfield Television,
Inc. V. Vermont Comm'r of Taxes, 133 Vt. 284, 336 A.2d 193 (1975); Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc. V. Commissioner, 176 Conn. 604, 410 A.2d 457 (1979); United Artists
Corp. V. Taylor, 273 N.Y. 334, N.E.2d 254 (1937); Turner Communications Corp. V.
Chilivis, 239 Ga. 91, 236 S.E.2d 251 (1977); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d
405 (Tenn. 1976); Michael Todd Co. V. County of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 684, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 604, 371 P.2d 340 (1962).
53. See. e.g., Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976).
54. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement ofFinancial Accounting Stan
dards No. 68, "Research and Development Arrangements" (1982).
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software product to the arranging firm, which promptly records the
software as an asset. Had the software been constructed internally,
there would be pressure to expense the construction cost as research
and development. A survey was mailed to software vendors in con
junction with the research for this article. The survey supported the
above theory, although the responses revealed that a very small per
centage of software vendors participate in research and development
arrangements. Those that do have valid business reasons for partici
pating, apart from the beneficial financial statement effect. ss
IV.

SOFTWARE COSTS: SHOULD THEY BE CAPITALIZED OR
EXPENSED?

Prior to June, 1969, when IBM unbundled, this question was not
an issue. Software costs were included in the price of the hardware.
The costs were amortized over the useful life of the hardware. After
IBM began stating its software prices separately from its hardware
prices, and as firms began to develop their own software, this question
frequently began to be raised. Over the past two decades, software
costs have become an increasingly important expenditure in most cor
porate budgets. While it was easy to expense relatively minor software
costs in the past, for reasons of materiality it has become increasingly
difficult to state emphatically that software expenditures are immate
rial when they continue to increase every year. 56
FASB defines assets as "probable future economic benefits ob
tained or controlled by a particular entity as a result of past transac
tions or events."S7
The Statement states further:
An asset has three essential characteristics: (a) it embodies a
probable future benefit that involves a capacity, singly or in combi
nation with other assets, to contribute directly or indirectly to fu
ture net cash inflows, (b) a particular enterprise can obtain the
benefit and control others' access to it, and (c) the transaction or
other event giving rise to the enterprise's right to or control of the
55. R. MCGEE, ACCOUNTING FOR SOFTWARE CoSTS (1984). Chapter five of Ac
COUNTING FOR SoFTWARE CoSTS discusses vendor participation and research develop
ment costs.
56. A spokesman for lIT has revealed that $27.9 million in software development
costs were placed on the balance sheet as assets in 1982, compared to earnings of $702.8
million. See Hudson, SEC May Curb Accounting Rule for Software, Wall St. J., April 8,
1983 at p. 52, col I. For a further discussion of software accounting see generally McGee,
Software Accounting Policy: Does it Matter? 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 705 (1985).
57. Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB Statement No.3 (1974).
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benefit has already occurred. 58

Expenses, on the other hand, have doubtful future economic ben
efit. From these criteria, the answer appears simple. Software that has
probable future economic benefit should be recorded as an asset and
amortized over its estimated economic life. Software with doubtful
economic benefit should be expensed. Unfortunately, the answer is
not quite that simple. Some accountants argue for capitalization59
while others continue to argue for expense treatment. 60 Several arti
cles have addressed the topic in recent years,61 and it appears that the
issue will continue to be in the news for the next few years. The
AICPA has formed a task force to study the issue,62 and the Securities
and Exchange Commission has imposed a moratorium on the capitali
zation of certain software costS.63
A.

The Controversy

The controversy, simply stated, is whether software costs should
be classified as assets or expensed. The question, however, is not
merely philosophical. The choice can affect a company's earnings as
well as its ability to raise capital. There are at least 4,000 companies in
the United States that construct software for sale. Software expendi
tures for all such companies constitute a significant percentage of net
58. Id.
59. See Paulsen, Software Development Costs Should Be Capitalized, MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNTING 40,40-42 (1983); see also McGee, supra note 56 at 706.
60. See Gannon & Parkinson, Software Development Costs Should Be Expensed,
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 37,39 (1983).
61. A sample of articles that address software accounting policy include Adams, Pr0
gramming Computer Software Into Financial Statements, Going Concerns, Queens College
Accounting Honor Society, October 19, 1983, at 4; Alex Brown & Sons, Industry Account
ing Concerns, COMPUTER SERVICES MONTHLY (Aug., 1982); Burns & Peterson, Account
ingfor Computer Software, J. ACCT. 50,51,53-56,58 (April, 1982); Expenses, Shmexpenses,
FORBES 13 (May 23, 1983); Fingleton, Capital Offense, FORBES 100,100-101 (Jan. 17,
1983); Fingleton, u.s. Laws Hit Hi-Tech, ACCOUNTANCY AGE 21 (April 21, 1983); Littrel,
Death ofan Asset-The R&D Blood Bath, MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 63 (Jan., 1981);
McGee, Accounting for Software-A Progress Report, MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 38,66
(Jan., 1983); McGee, Accounting for Software Costs Study Is Under Way, AssOCIATION
LEADER 1,9 (Oct., 1983); McGee, Software Accounting is New MAP Project, AssOCIATION
LEADER 1,1-2 (Jan., 1983); Neal, Caution for Lotus-Eaters, FORBES, 52,54 (Sept. 26, 1983);
Pridemore, Software: Should Development Costs be Expensed or Capitalized?, MANAGE
MENT ACCOUNTING, 33,33-36 (Nov., 1983).
62. Task Force of AcSec Studies Computer Software Accounting, J. ACCT. 9 (June,
1983).
63. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Accounting for Costs of Internally De
veloping Computer Software for Sale or Lease to Others, 17 C.F.R. Parts 210 and 239;
Release Nos. 33-6476; 34-20061; FR-12, File No. S7-968. Aug. 8, 1983. Published in the
Federal Register Vol. 48, No. 157, Friday, Aug. 12, 1983, at 36566-36571.
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income. Classifying software expenditures as assets or expenses can
make the difference between making a profit or incurring a loss. One
public company that reported a profit of $2.2 million in 1981 would
have had a loss of $1 million that year if certain software expenditures
had been expensed instead of capitalized. In 1982, the reported $2.5
million profit would have been a $4 million 10ss.64 There is some evi
dence to suggest that accounting policy can affect expansion65 and the
ability to raise capital. 66 The interviews conducted in the course of
this study and the questionnaire responses confirm this conclusion.

B.

The Catalyst

If there is a single event responsible for the birth of the software
accounting issue, it is the issuance by the Association of Data Process
ing Service Organizations (ADAPSO) of the Exposure Draft on
software accounting67 in April, 1982. This Exposure Draft detailed
clear guidelines for accounting for software costs and revenues. Its
issuance caused the AICP A to form a task force to study the issue.
V.

AUTHOR'S VIEWS

Most software that is purchased or constructed internally does
not fit within the definition of research and development. Most
software is constructed from existing technology using existing coding
methods. Any research and development occurs in the early stages
prior to construction. Software is beyond the development stage when
technological feasibility is established.
The interviews conducted in conjunction with this study and the
questionnaire survey results indicate that many companies automati
cally assume that internally constructed software falls within the defi
nition of research and development. Internally constructed software is
Fingleton, Capital Offense, FORBES 100,100-101 (Jan. 17, 1983); see also Fingle
Laws Hit Hi-Tech, ACCOUNTANCY AGE 21 (April 21, 1983); Expenses,
Shmexpenses, FORBES 10,13 (May 23, 1983).
65. See Horwitz & Kolodny, Has the FASB Hurt Small High-Technology Compa
nies?, HARV. Bus. REv. 44,48-52, (1980); see also McGee supra note 56 at 706.
66. See R. MCGEE, THE EFFECTS OF SOFIWARE ACCOUNTING POLICIES ON BANK
LENDING DECISIONS AND STOCK PRICE (1984); El-Arabi, "The Effects of Accounting Al
ternatives on Lending Decisions of Commercial Bankers," Ph.D. dissertation, The Louisi
ana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 1977; EI-Maksy, "A
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effects of FASB Statement No. 33 on Lend
ing Decisions," Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York, 1983; Jain, "A Study of
the Effects of Alternative Methods of Accounting for Income Taxes on Term Loan Deci
sions," Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1970.
67. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, "Accounting Guidelines
for the Computer Services Industry," Exposure Draft, April, 1982.
64.

ton,

u.s.
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therefore often expensed. It is the opinion of this author that such a
view is incorrect. Each software project should be evaluated on its
own merits and classified accordingly.
The accounting treatment for purchased software should mirror
the accounting treatment for comparable internally constructed
software. If a company plans to use a payroll program or accounts
receivable program for the next five years, the cost of obtaining that
program should be amortized over five years, regardless of whether
the software was purchased or internally constructed.
The responses from the interviews and the questionnaire indicate
that the present practice of most companies includes expensing inter
nally constructed software and capitalizing purchased software. The
usual reasons for this practice are that it is easier to determine the cost
of purchased software, or that a purchased software product has a bet
ter chance of having future economic benefit because it has already
been extensively tested and debugged. In this author's opinion, these
reasons are insufficient. Merely because the cost of a purchased pro
gram is easier to determine is not sufficient reason to expense the costs
of internally constructing comparable software. Once the feasibility of
a project has been determined, the risk of failure is small enough to
warrant capitalization treatment. Furthermore, the production costs
of motion picture films and records are already being capitalized. The
production process for software is similar in many ways to that of
records and films.
The cost of internally constructed software can be broken down
into the following six categories:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Feasibility costs, and other costs incurred prior to design costs
in the software product life cycle;
design costs;
coding costs;
testing costs;
support costs; and
service costs.

In cases where the finished software product is expected to have
future economic benefit, the costs that are incurred for designing, cod
ing, and testing should be capitalized and amortized over the expected
period of benefit. Pre-design costs, such as feasibility costs, should be
expensed. Furthermore, service and support costs should be expensed
because these costs have doubtful future economic benefit, and more
nearly resemble period costs than capitalizable costs.
The straight-line method is an acceptable method of amortization
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for intangible assets. This method can be used in cases where software
is classified as intangible.
At least two other methods may also be considered for software
that is developed for sale. The period-table-computation method,
which is sometimes used to amortize motion picture film costs, can be
used to amortize software intended for sale. This method amortizes
software costs prepared from historic revenue patterns of a large group
of previously marketed software products. Although that revenue pat
tern is assumed to provide a reasonable guide to the experience of suc
ceeding groups of software products produced and distributed under
similar conditions, these tables should not be used for a software prod
. uct that is expected to have a significantly different revenue pattern
from those products which were included in the table. The periodic
tables should be reviewed regularly and updated whenever revenue
patterns change significantly.
An acceptable alternative method of amortization is the individ
ual-software-forecast-computation method, a variation of which is
used to amortize motion picture film production costs. This method
may be illustrated by the following examples:
Assume that a certain software product costs $18,000,000 to de
velop and is expected to generate revenues of $50,000,000 over its use
ful economic life. By the end of the second year, the amount of total
anticipated revenues is reduced to $30,000,000 due to lagging sales.
Actual revenue received in each of the first three years is:
First year
Second year
Third year

$10,000,000
$ 6,000,000
$ 5,000,000

Amortization in each of the first three years is computed as follows:
First year
Second year
Third year

$10,000,000
$ 6,000,000
$ 5,000,000

Amortization in each of the first three years is computed as follows:
First Year

Amount of
Amortization

$10,000,000 X $18,000,000
$3,600,000
$50,000,000
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Second Year
(a)

Assuming change in anticipated total revenues
from $50,000,000 to $30,000,000:
$ 6,000,000 X $14,440,000
$4,320,000
$20,000,000

Where:
(1)
(2)

(3)

(b)

$6,000,000 is actual revenue in the second year;
$20,000,000 is the adjusted total anticipated remaining
revenue ($30,000,000 - $10,000,000);
and
$14,400,000 is original cost ($18,000,000)
less accumulated amortization ($3,600,00)

Assuming no change in anticipated total
revenues:
$ 6,000,000 X $18,000,000
$2,160,000
$50,000,000

Third Year
(a)

Assuming change in anticipated total revenues
from $50,000,000
$ 6,000,000 X $14,440,000
$4,320,000
$20,000,000

Where:
(1)
(2)

(3)

(b)

$6,000,000 is actual revenue in the second year;
$20,000,000 is the adjusted total anticipated remaining
revenue ($30,000,000 - $10,000,000);
and
$14,400,000 is original cost ($18,000,000)
less accumulated amortization ($3,600,00)

Assuming no change in anticipated total
revenues:
$ 6,000,000 X $18,000,000
$2,160,000
$50,000,000
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Third Year
(a)

Assuming change in anticipated total revenues
from $50,000,000 to $30,000,000:
$ 5,000,000 X $14,440,000
$3,600,000
$20,000,000
The adjusted total anticipated remaining
revenue ($20,000,000) and adjusted cost
($14,400,000) need not be reduced by the
second year actual revenue ($6,000,000), and
second year amortization ($4,320,000)
respectively, because adjusted total anticipated
remaining revenue ($20,000,000) did not
change from the second to third year. If the
reduction were made, the result would not
change.
$ 5,000,000 X ($14,440,000-$4,320,000)
$3,600,000
$20,000,000
- $6,000,000

(b)

Assuming no change in anticipated total
revenues:
$ 5,000,000 X $18,000,000
$1,800,000
$50,000,000

Although the individual-software-forecast-computation method
and the period-table-computation method may be appropriate
amortization methods in certain instances, they are not necessarily the
only acceptable methods. Other methods that reasonably relate the
amount of the revenue expected to be realized to the amount of
capitalized expenditures are also acceptable.
Software costs meeting the definition of research and
development should be expensed as incurred in keeping with FASB
Statement No.2. If the software has alternative future uses, however,
it should be capitalized and amortized over the period of expected
benefit. The alternative future use test does not apply to the internal
development of computer software. 68
Software expenditures, if considered tangible property, should be
classified as assets included in the "fixed assets" portion of the balance
68. See FASB Interpretation No.6, paragraph 8, n.2.
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sheet. Intangible software expenditures qualifying as assets should
appear in the "other assets" section of the balance sheet.
Software expenditures should not be separately disclosed unless
they are material in amount. Software expenses can be considered
material if they equal or exceed five percent of sales. Software assets
can be considered material if they equal or exceed five percent of total
assets. Disclosure may be by footnote or by separately stating
software expenditures in the body of the income statement or balance
sheet.
When the possibility exists to acquire hardware and software
"bundled" or "unbundled," the following factors should be
considered:
A.

Amortization

Software that might otherwise be expensed might be depreciated
if combined with hardware costs. Likewise, software that would be
capitalized if bundled might qualify for expense treatment if stated
separately.
B.

Investment Tax Credit

Software that would not otherwise qualify for the investment tax
credit may so qualify if it is bundled with the related hardware. Even
if software is acquired separately, the possibility of taking an invest
ment tax credit should be examined. At least one court has held that
the investment tax credit may be taken on unbundled software.

c.

Sales/Use Tax

Bundling hardware and software may increase the amount of
sales/use tax a buyer is required to pay. Some states do not tax the
sale of software if sold separately from the hardware. Software deliv
ered on cards, disk, or magnetic tape might be subject to tax in some
states, even though the identical software, if delivered over telephone
lines, would not be taxed.
D.

Property Tax

Bundling hardware and software may increase the amount of
property tax the owner must pay. Many states levy a property tax on
tangible property only. Software, if accounted separately from hard
ware, is often classified as intangible property.

E.
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Different Accounting Treatments

The accounting treatment for financial reporting need not be the
same as that used for tax reporting. Software expenditures may be
expensed as incurred for tax purposes and capitalized and amortized
for financial reporting purposes and vice versa. If different methods
are used, the tax effect of the difference is reflected in the deferred tax
account.
ACCOUNTING FOR SOFTWARE

Alternative

Future Use

Capitalize

'\!..O='-"-''''-_ R&D Expense
Created

R&D Expense

Probable Future
Economic Benefit Capitalize

No Probable Future
Economic Benefit G&A. Selling or Production Expense

Feasibility
Conceptual Design
or Maintenance

G&A, Selling or Production Expense

Probable Future
P==-""'=-Capitalize
No Probable
Future Economic
Benefit
""'='-----G&A, Selling or Production

Expense

VI.

A.

STATE TAXATION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE

Tangibility
Whether software is classified as tangible or intangible often de
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termines whether the software in question is subject to the state sales,
use, or property tax. Software, if intangible, is generally exempt from
tax. Many states place a tax on the sale, use, or ownership of tangible
computer software. Some states treat "canned" programs as tangible
property subject to tax, whereas "custom" programs are classified as
intangible or as a service rather than a product. 69 As of late 1983,
thirty-three states assessed a sales or use tax on prewritten programs
and twenty states did so for custom programs. 70
Prior to 1972, no court had ruled on the tangibility or taxability
of software, because software had always been sold in conjunction
with hardware without any separate price being stated. Shortly after
IBM "unbundled" in 1969, the price of software began to be stated
separately from the hardware. Although computer hardware was
clearly tangible and therefore subject to the sales, use, and property
tax, the classification of software was less clear. The first case to ad
dress the tangibility of software was District of Columbia v. .Universal
Computer AsSOCS. 71 In Universal, the Court held that the "canned"
and "custom" programs in question were intangible and therefore not
subject to the personal property tax,72 the rationale being that it was
the intangible information contained on the cards that was being
purchased, rather than the cards themselves. Once the information
contained in the cards was transferred into the computer, all that re
mained was the knowledge, which is intangible. 73
Other courts have applied different tests to determine tangibility
of software. The Texas Supreme Court, for instance, applied the "es
sence of the transaction" test, and held where the transaction is in
essence the purchase of an intangible, such as a custom or canned pro
69. Prewritten programs, also called "canned" or "off the shelf' programs, are stan
dardized programs that are sold to many buyers "as is," without alteration. "Custom"
programs are written to meet the needs of one particular customer and are often treated as
the sale of a service rather than the sale of a product.
70. See PALENSKI, SALES AND USE TAX STATUS OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS BY
STATE (1983).
71. 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
72. Id. at 619.
73. This line of reasoning is called the "knowledge rationale." Other cases have re
lied on a similar line of reasoning to justify the classification of software as intangible. In a
Tennessee case it was held that both systems and applications software are intangible in
cases where the tangible medium used (card, tape, disk, etc.) is either returned to the seller
or destroyed. The reasoning is that the property purchased is actually intangible knowl
edge, and the use of a tangible medium to transfer that intangible knowledge is "merely
incidental to the purchase of the intangible knowledge and information stored on the
tapes." Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 at 408 (Tenn. 1976). This line
of reasoning is called the "personal service rationale." Id.

676

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:651

gram, the sale is exempt from the Texas sales tax which applies only to
the sale of tangible property.74
The "relative value" test has also been applied to software tax
cases;75 This test recognizes software creation to be a process involv
ing both tangible and intangible elements. Most of the value of a
software product is attributable to the intellectual content. The tangi
ble medium used to store and transfer this knowledge represents mere
incidental costs. Programs selling for $100,000 might be stored on a
tape or disk costing less than $50. The purchaser of a program, there
fore, actually purchases "knowledge," rather than a physical product.
The "mode of transmission" test has also been applied in several
cases. 76 This test holds that the sale in question is the sale of intangi
ble property where the knowledge can be conveyed from the seller to
the buyer without the use of a physical medium such as a card, tape,
or disk. Computer programs can be transferred directly to the buyer's
computer over telephone lines or by satellite.
B.

Case Law in Related Areas

Prior to 1972, there were no
with respect to software taxation.
between software and other types
analogized software programs to

precedents for courts to consider
Analogies were drawn, therefore,
of property. Several courts have
films and phonograph records. 77

74. First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979).
75. See James v. TRES Computer Sys., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. banc 1982).
James cites District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir.
1972) and Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976) as two cases
that employed this rationale. James, 642 S.W.2d at 349.
76. See District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976); First Nat'l
Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); State of Ala. v. Central
Computer Servs., Inc., 349 So.2d 1160 (Ala. 1977). These cases are discussed in some
detail in James, 642 S.W.2d at 348-50.
77. See Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983); Commerce
Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976); Comptroller of the Treasury v.
Equitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983); First Nat'l Bank of Springfield v.
Department of Revenue, 85 Ill.2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981); Greyhound Computer Corp.
v. State Dep't of Assessments and Tax'n, 271 Md. 674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974); James v. TRES
Computer Serv., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. banc 1982).
For cases involving the tangibility of films and records for sales, use, and property tax
purposes, see Recording Devices Co. v. Bowers, 174 Ohio St. 518, 190 N.E.2d 258 (1963);
Recording Devices Co. v. Porterfield, 30 Ohio St.2d 208, 283 N.E.2d 626 (1972); Michael
Todd Co. v. County of Los Angeles 57 Cal.2d 684, 21 Cal. Rptr. 604, 371 P.2d 340 (1962);
University Microfilms v. Scio Township, 76 Mich. App. 616, 257 N.W.2d 265 (1977), leave
to appeal denied, 402 Mich. 880 (1978); Boswell v. Paramount Television Sales, Inc., 291
Ala. 490, 282 So.2d 892 (1973); Crescent Amusement Co. v. Carson, 187 Tenn. 112,213
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Computer software has much in common with films and records, but
several distinctions can be made as well. Most of the value of a film or
record is attributable to the intellectual and artistic content rather
than the celluloid, plastic, or paper upon which that content is re
corded. 7s The plastic or celluloid upon which the record or film is
recorded is a crucial element. 79 Without the plastic there could be no
record, without the film there could be no movie. Cards, tape, and
disks, however, are not necessary to store a computer program and
can be transferred to another physical location by telephone line or
satellite.
Another distinction that can be made between film and software
is that the medium upon which the computer program is recorded can
be returned to the seller or destroyed after the program has been run
through the computer. Movie film, on the other hand, has continuing
value after the movie has been shown, it can be used again and again. so
A similar analogy can be made to phonograph records. sl
A third distinction drawn between software and films and records
is that the latter items can be used immediately upon purchase,
whereas software must first be translated into a language that can be
understood by the computer. S2 Furthermore, films and records are
immediately perceptible to the senses, whereas software, in essence, is
not. S3
A fourth distinction that has been made between software and
films and records is that the software sales or licensing agreement
often includes periodic updating by the seller. Films and records, on
the other hand, are not updated after the sale. S4 This distinction, howS.W.2d 27 (1948); United Artists Corp. v. Taylor, 273 N.Y. 334, 7 N.E.2d 254 (1937);
Saenger Realty Corp. v. Grosjean, 194 La. 470, 193 So. 710, cert. denied, 310 U.S. 613
(1940); J.A. Burgess Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill. 427, 194 N.E. 565 (1935); District of Columbia
v. Norwood Studios, Inc., 336 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc. v.
State Bel. of Equalization, 101 Cal. App.3d 184, 161 Cal. Rptr. 558, 615 P.2d 555 (1980).
78. Films, records, and books are generally treated as tangible property for sales tax
purposes. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
79. See Heinzman, Computer Software: Should It Be Treated As Tangible Property
For Ad Valorem Tax?, 37 J. TAX'N 184,185 (1972); Bryant & Mather, Property Taxation of
Computer Software 18 N.Y.L.F. 58,74 (1972).
80. See District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615,617
18 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W. 2d 405,408 (Tenn. 1976).
81. 538 S.W.2d at 408.
82. See Alabama v. Central Computer Servs., Inc., 349 So.2d 1160,1162 (Ala. 1977);
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405,408 (Tenn. 1976).
83. See Case, Sales and Use Tax of Computer Software-Is Software Tangible per
sonal Property?, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 1503,1518 (1981).
84. Bryant & Mather, Property Taxation of Computer Software, 18 N.Y.L.F. 59,74
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ever, does not apply to the many programs that are not updated after
sale.
Courts have also considered the issue of whether the sale of com
puter software constitutes the sale of a product or a personal service.
This issue is frequently raised in service bureau cases,85 although anal
ogies to the Uniform Commercial Code86 and the sale of information 87
have also been proffered. Generally, if software is viewed as a product
or good, it is tangible property subject to sales, use, and property taxa
tion. If viewed as a service, however, software is intangible and not
subject to these taxes. Canned programs are more likely to be viewed
as products than are custom programs, which involve more personal
service.
Software often involves elements of both sales and services, and
courts have developed several tests to aid the development of this dis
tinction. One test is whether the transfer of property is necessary or
merely convenient in order to achieve the primary purpose of the
(1972), reprinted in abbreviated/orm in THE MONTHLY DIGEST OF TAX ARTICLES, 31-40
(March, 1983).
85. See Intellidata, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 139 Cal. App.3d 594, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 850 (1983); Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v. Askew, Florida Div. of Admin. Hear
ings, No.76-1475 (1976); Credit Bureau of Miami County, Inc. v. Collins, 50 Ohio St.2d
270,364 N.E.2d 27 (1977); Miami Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Lindley, 50 Ohio St.2d 249,364
N.E.2d 25 (1977); Citizens Financial Corp. v. Kosydar, 43 Ohio St.2d 148,331 N.E.2d 435
(1975); Accountants Computer Servs., Inc. v. Kosydar; Central Data sys., Inc. v. Kosydar;
Jergens Co. v. Kosydar, all reported at 35 Ohio St.2d 120, 298 N.E.2d 519 (Ohio 1973);
Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 84 Wis.2d 341, 267 N.W.2d
656 (1978).
86. The Uniform Commercial Code distinguishes the sale of "goods" from the sale of
"services." For UCC cases that have been cited in cases addressing the issue of software
taxation, see Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765, (E.D.N.Y .
. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979); F & M Schaefer Corp. v. Elec
tronic Data Sys. Corp., 430 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd mem., 614 F.2d 1286 (2d
Cir. 1979); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973),
affd mem., 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1973); Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 151 Ind.
App. 176, 278 N.E.2d 608 (1972) .
. 87. For cases involving the sale of mailing lists, see Fingerhut Prod Co. v. Commis
sioner of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1977); Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Director, Division
of Tax'n, 182 N.J. Super. 179,440 A.2d 104 (1981); Mertz v. State Tax Comm'n, 89
A.D.2d 396, 456 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1982). For cases involving the sale of stock exchange
information, see Quotron Sys. v. Comptroller, 287 Md. 178,411 A.2d 439 (1980); Dun &
Bradstreet v. City of New York, 276 N.Y. 198, 11 N.E.2d 728 (1937); Bunker-Ramo Corp.
v. Porterfield, 21 Ohio St.2d 231, 257 N.E.2d 365 (1970). For other cases addressing the
product versus service, see Washington Times-Herald v. District of Columbia, 213 F.2d 23
(D.C. Cir. 1954)(artwork); Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 366 S.2d 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)(artwork); Credit Bureau of Miami
County, Inc. v. Collins, 50 OhioSt.2d 270,364 N.E.2d 27 (1977)(credit information); Gen
eral Data Corp. v. Porterfield, 21 Ohio St.2d 233, 257 N.E.2d 359 (1970)(hotel reservation
information).
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transaction.88 Another test is whether the value of the materials is
small compared to the value of the services. 89 A third test is whether
the item transferred has value only to the purchaser (as is the case
when a custom program is acquired), or whether the item can be sold
to the general public (as is the case with canned programs).90
In the case of canned programs, no services are performed.
Canned programs are sold "off the shelf," and are available to the pub
lic-at-Iarge. They are conveyed to the purchaser on a tangible prop
erty such as a card, tape, or disk. The tangible medium is merely
incidental to the transaction. In contrast, custom programs are
designed for a particular customer and are of no value to the general
public. The value of the tangible medium is slight, compared to the
val':le of the services required to write the custom program.
C. Software Tax Cases
The first case to directly address the software tangibility issue was
District of Columbia v. Universal Computer AsSOCS.,91 which held that
software was intangible and therefore not subject to the personal prop
erty tax. The following year, the California court held that software is
intangible and therefore not subject to the sales tax. 92 In another early
case,93 Greyhound Computer Corporation purchased several com
puter systems in which the price of the hardware and software were
not separately stated. The Maryland Department of Assessments and
Taxation treated the cost of the software as inseparable from that of
the hardware and based its property tax assessment on aggregate
purchase price, less depreciation, without allocating the cost of the
software package between tangible property acquired and services to
88. Bigsby v. Johnson, 99 P.2d 268 (1940), rev'd. on other grounds, 18 Ca1.2d 860,
118 P.2d 289 (1941); Howitt v. Street & Smith Publications, Inc., 276 N.Y. 345, 12 N.E.2d
435 (1938). See also Case, Sales and Use Tax ofComputer Software - Is Software Tangible
Personal Property?, 27 WAYNE LAW REv. 1520 (1981).
89. District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Mahon v. Nudelman, 377 111.331,36 N.E.2d 550(1941); Community Telecast
ing Servo v. Johnson, 220 A.2d 500 (Me. 1966); Barry-Kofron Dental Lab. Co. v. Smith,
345 Mo. 922, 137 S.W.2d 452 (1940); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405
(Tenn. 1976).
90. United Aircraft Corp. v. O'Connor, 141 Conn. 530, 107 A.2d 398 (1954); Bucy
rus-Erie Co. v. Lorenz, 26 Ill.2d 183, 186 N.E.2d 250 (1962); University Microfilms v. Scio
Township, 76 Mich. App. 616, 257 N.W.2d 265 (1977),leave to appeal denied, 402 Mich.
880 (1978).
91. 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
92. County of Sacramento v. Assessment App. Bd., 32 Cal. App.3d 654,671, 108
Cal. Rptr. 434,446 (1973).
93. Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Dep't of Assessments and Tax'n, 271 Md.
674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974).
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be rendered. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that it was error
not to allocate the purchase price between the tangible and intangible
components. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. 94
In Commerce Union Bankv. Tidwell,9s the Supreme Court of
Tennessee held that the sale of software is the sale of information, and
that the magnetic tapes that contain this information are only a
method of transmitting these intellectual creations from the source to
the user. The court concluded further that it is merely incidental that
these intangibles are transmitted by way of a tangible reel of tape that
is not even retained by the user. Tennessee did not attempt to tax
computer programs purchased by the bank which were transmitted to
its computers from outside the state by way of telephone lines. That
method was deemed to constitute the purchase of intangible personal
property.96 The court stated "the principle is the same, only the
method of transmitting the information is difi"erent."97
The year after Tidwell was decided in Tennessee, the Alabama
Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in a similar case. In State
ofAla. v. Central Computer Servs., Inc.,98 Central Computer Services
licensed certain software programs for a ninety-nine year term. Upon
receipt of the software, Central extracted the information contained on
the magnetic tapes and punched cards, and transferred the programs
to magnetic discs. The tapes were then returned to the lessor and the
cards were discarded. The Alabama State Department of Revenue as
sessed a use tax of $13,519.91 against Central for its purchase of the
programs. Central alleged the programs were intangible property and,
therefore, not subject to the use tax. Holding for Central, the court
ruled that Central purchased the information or knowledge which
went into the development of the eight programs. It did, however,
also purchase tapes and punched cards. The magnetic tapes and
punched cards were merely the means by which this information or
94. Id. at 682, 320 A.2d at 57. For analogies to the film-making industry, the court
cited Michael Todd Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. Rptr. 604, 371 P.2d 340 (1962)
and District of Columbia v. Norwood Studios, Inc., 336 F.2d 746 (1964). This analogy was
challenged in Heinzman, Computer Software: Should It Be Treated As Tangible Property
For Ad Valorem Tax?, 37 J. TAX'N 184,185-87 (1972).
95. 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976). The result in Tidwell has since been changed by
statute. See TENN. CoDE ANN. § 67-6-203 (1983).
96. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d at 408.
97. Id.
98. 349 So.2d 1160 (1977). This case was a case of first impression in Alabama. The
court's decision was influenced by Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405
(Tenn. 1976) and District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615
(1972).
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knowledge was transferred. 99 The state cited Boswell v. Paramount
Television Sales, Inc. loo In Boswell, the court held that the leasing of
movie films and tapes by Paramount to television stations in Alabama
involved the leasing of tangible personal property rather than an intan
gible right to publish as Paramount argued. In Central, the court dis
tinguished the magnetic tapes and punched cards from the movie
films. In Boswell, the court noted that the right to publish or broad
cast the motion picture was physically inseparable from the movie film
itself. The physical presence of the movie film is essential to broad
casting the intangible artistic efforts of the actors.
In Central, however, the physical presence of magnetic tapes and
punched cards was not essential to the transmittal of the desired infor
mation from its creator to Central. This information could be tele
phoned to the computer or brought into Alabama in the mind of an
employee of the lessor.
In its summary, the court stated:
(W]e find in the present case that there is an incidental physical
commingling of the intangible information sought by Central Com
puter Services and the tangible magnetic tapes and punched cards
themselves. We therefore hold that the essence of this transaction
was the purchase of nontaxable intangible information. 101

Texas, which first addressed the software tax issue in 1977 in Bul
lock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 102 addressed the issue a second
time in 1979 in First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock. \03 In the
latter case, the bank purchased several standardized or "canned" pro
grams which enabled its computer to perform deposit and lending
functions and process general accounting. The software was con
tained on magnetic tapes, but the information could have been trans
mitted by keypunch cards, telephone, or various other methods.
The Texas law places a tax on a sale of tangible personal prop
erty. Tangible personal property is defined as "personal property that
may be seen, weighed, measured, felt or otherwise perceived by the
senses."I04 According to the Texas Civil Court of Appeals, the courts
apply the "essence of the transaction" test to determine whether a sale
99. 349 So.2d at 1162.
100. 291 Ala. 490, 282 So.2d 892 (1973).
101. 349 So.2d at 1162. Alabama Rule C28-OO1 presently exempts both prewritten
and custom programs from sales and use taxation.
102. 549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1977).
103. 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
104. TEX. TAX CoDE ANN. § 1.104 (5) (Vernon 1983).
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is of tangible or intangible property. lOS "If the object or essence of the
sale is intangible property, the transaction is not taxable."lo6 There
fore, an important factor to consider in arriving at this determination
is the fact that the desired information could have been transferred by
several different means. 107
The Fort Worth court offered the following analysis of two cases
in which data was held not taxable.
In Statistical Tabulating, the Court held that processed data
contained [on] a coded computer card was an intangible and, [there
fore,] not taxable. In Williams and Lee Scouting. statistical data on
oil and gas well production was compiled and mailed to subscribers
in printed reports each week. The sale was not taxed. The purchas
ers in both Williams and Lee Scouting and Statistical Tabulating
[desired] something beyond the tangible object involved in the
transaction. 108

The court compared computer cards to "a phonograph record or film
strip [in which] the information is [contained on] tape," and concluded
that the transfer in Fort Worth involved a transfer to the computer.
The tape was no longer valuable or important to the user.109
Bullock contended that Fort Worth is distinguishable from Statis
tical Tabulating in that the software in the latter case was "custom
ized" because it was developed specially for the purchaser. 110 The
tapes in Fort Worth were "standard items sold to numerous customers
with only slight modifications to conform to each purchaser's use."lll
The service characteristic, according to Bullock, "is present only with
'customized' programs." 112
The court did not accept Bullock's argument that only "custom
ized" programs should be exempt from the sales tax. l13 The court
then concluded that the "test in each case is not whether the product
105. First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548,550 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979) (citing Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex 1977».
106. Fort Worth, 584 S.W.2d at 550.
107. Id.
108. Id. The tangible objects involved consisted of the computer cards and the paper
used in the printed reports. The purchasers purchased the information contained on the
computer cards and in the printed reports. The value of the material used in the computer
cards and the paper used in the printed reports was incidental.
109. Id. (citing State of Alabama v. Central Computer Services, Inc., 349 So.2d 1160
(Ala. 1977); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976».
110. Fort Worth, 584 S.W.2d at 550 (comparing Statistical Tabulating, 549 S.W.2d at
166).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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is 'customized' or 'canned,' but whether the object of the sale is tangi
ble personal property."114 "In Williams and Lee Scouting, the weekly
report of oil and gas data was a 'canned' publication in that the same
information was mailed to many subscribers."lls The Texas court
held that the programs in question were intangible and not subject to
the sales tax.1l6
Two years after Bullock was decided in Texas, the Illinois
Supreme Court heard a similar case and reached the same conclusion
reached by the Texas court. In First Nat'l Bank of Springfield v. De
partment ofRevenue, 117 the issue was whether the sale of applicational
programs (as opposed to operational programs), where the data is con
tained on magnetic tape, constituted the sale of tangible personal prop
erty subject to the Illinois use tax. IlS First National Bank purchased
computer "programs [that] were delivered on magnetic tape,"119
although other means of delivery were feasible. Upon delivery, "the
information was removed from the tapes and stored elsewhere, [at
which point] the tapes could either be used again or discarded."120
The bank contended that "the magnetic tapes in question consti
tuted intangible personal property, because they were, in essence,
merely a means of conveying programming instructions."121 Further
more, the software primarily represents intangible services rather than
tangible goodS. 122 According to the court, the Department contended
that the physical qualities of the tapes predominate over the infor
mation contained [therein]. The Department compare[d] the tapes
to films, phonograph records and books. All three examples, the
Department argue[d], represent the physical manifestation of intan
gible ideas and artistic achievement, yet all were taxable as tangible
personal property.123

The Illinois court held that the software in question was intangi
114. Fort Worth, 584 S.W.2d at 550 (citing District of Columbia v. Universal Com
puter Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538
S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976».
115. Fort Worth, 584 S.W.2d at 551 (discussing Williams and Lee Scouting, 452
S.W.2d at 789).
116. Williams and Lee Scouting, 452 S.W.2d at 792.
117. 85 m.2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981).
118. Id. at 86-87, 421 N.E.2d at 176-77.
119. Id. at 87, 421 N.E.2d at 177.
120. Id. at 87, 421 N.E.2d at 177.
121. Id. at 87-88, 421 N.E.2d at 177.
122. Id. at 88, 421 N.E.2d at 177.
123. Id. In its argument, the Department cited Time, Inc. v. Hulman, 31 m.2d 344,
201 N.E.2d 374 (1964), in which the Illinois court decided that magazines are tangible
personal property and that the proceeds from their sale would be subject to the retailers'
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ble. 124 It held previously "that where a service of skill was rendered in
the manufacture of a special milling machine for the particular and
exclusive use of a purchaser, the sale of the product was not taxable
where it was merely incidental to the service."12s First Nat'/ Bank
involved a similar issue: 126
The plaintiff bank purchased, in substance, the means of pro
gramming its computer so that it could perform [necessary banking
functions]. The bank did not desire to spend the money or time to
formulate the programs through its own data processing staff.
Therefore it purchased instruction programs from other sources. It
simply happened that, for the sake of convenience and easy han
dling, the programs were recorded on magnetic tapes. The tapes
were certainly not the only medium through which the information
could be transferred. In this way, the tapes differ from a movie film,
a phonograph record or a book, [because in the latter] the media
used [is] the only practicable [way to preserve] those articles. 127

While film, records, and books are similar to the magnetic tape
"in that they physically represent the transfer of ideas or artistic
processes," there exists a significant distinction. 128 Film, records, and
books "are inseparable from the ideas or processes expressed,
[whereas] computer programs are separable from the tapes."129
Software information can be conveyed in numerous ways.l30 It may
even be copied from off the tapes and stored on another medium. 13l
Therefore, "it is not the tapes which are the substance of the transac
tion, it is the information."132
The court held "that the sale of computer software in [this in
stance] is, in substance, the transfer of intangible personal property,
and as such, it is not taxable under the Illinois Use Tax ACt."l33
occupation tax were it not for an exclusion afforded to newspapers and other materials
"such as newsprint." Id.
124. Id. at 91, 421 N.E.2d at 179.
125. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Department of Revenue, 405 Ill. 367, 90
N.E.2d 747 (1950).
126. First Nat'l Bank of Springfield, 85 Ill.2d at 91, 421 N.E.2d at 179.
127. Id. at 90-91, 421 N.E.2d at 178.
128. Id. at 91, 421 N.E.2d at 789 (citing Bryant & Mather, Property Taxation of
Computer Software, 18 N.Y.L.F 59,59-67 (1972); reprinted in THE MONTHLY DIGEST OF
TAX ARTICLES, March, 1973, at 31-40).
129. First Nat'l Bank of Springfield, 85 Ill.2d at 91, 421 N.E.2d at 789.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 91-92, 421 N.E.2d at 789 (citing First National Bank v. Bullock, 584
S.W.2d 548,551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of
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Soon after the First Nat'l Bank ofSpringfield case was decided in
Illinois, a case having a similar fact pattern was heard across the bor
der in Missouri. In James v. TRES Computer Sys., Inc., 134 the issue
was whether the sale of "canned" software is a taxable event. In hold
ing software to be intangible and not subject to the Missouri use tax,
the court based its decision on the decisions reached in Alabama, Ten
nessee, Texas, Illinois, the District of Columbia, and Wisconsin. 13S

D.

1983: A Turning Point or an Aberration?

In a long line of cases since 1972, a number of states have ruled
almost uniformly that software is intangible for state sales, use, and
property tax purposes. The "knowledge" rationale has been applied
along with the "essence of the transaction" and several other tests.
Software has been compared to and distinguished from films, records,
and books, all of which have been held to be tangible. In 1983, two
court cases, Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co. 136 and
Chittenden Trust Co. v. King,137 decided one day apart, disregarded
this long line of precedent.
In Equitable Trust Co., the issue was whether the purchase of a
"canned" or "off the shelf' program on magnetic tape constituted a
transaction upon which a sales tax could be assessed.138 Equitable en
tered into several license agreements whereby it obtained the nontransRevenue, 84 Wis.2d 341,347, 287 N.W.2d 656,659 (1978); Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc. v.
Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 171,173,575 P.2d 801,803 (1978); State v. Central Computer
Servs., Inc., 349 So.2d 1160,1162 (Ala. 1977); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538
S.W.2d 405,408 (Tenn. 1976); District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc.,
465 F.2d 615,618 (D.C. Cir. 1972); County of Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No.
2, 32 Cal. App.3d 654,670-71, 108 Cal. Rptr. 434,446 (1973»; CAL. REv. & TAX CoDE
§§ 995 and 995.2 (West. Supp. 1974) (subjects operational software to property taxation,
but exempts applicational software). See also Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Dep't of
Assessments and Tax'n, 271 Md. 674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974)(only so much of software as
consists of services is intangible and not taxable).
134. 642 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. 1982).
135. See James, 642 S.W.2d at 348-51 for a discussion of the following state cases:
State of Alabama v. Central Computer Servs., Inc., 349 So.2d 1160 (Ala. 1977); Commerce
Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976); Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating
Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1977); First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d
548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); First Nat'l Bank of Springfield v. Department of Revenue, 85
Il1.2d 84, 51 Ill. Dec. 667,421 N.W.2d 175 (1981); District of Columbia v. Universal Com
puter Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. Wiscon
sin Dep't of Revenue, 84 Wis.2d 341, 267 N.W.2d 656 (1978).
136. 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983).
137. 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983).
138. Equitable, 296 Md. at 460, 464 A.2d at 249.
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ferable and nonexclusive right to use several programs in perpetuity.
Legal title remained with the licensor.
The Comptroller alleged that these transactions constituted trans
actions involving tangible personal property (magnetic tapes which
had been enhanced in value by the copies of the programs coded
thereon) and are subject to sales tax. In its amicus brief, the Data
Processing Management Association (DPMA) contended that the
transactions were licenses to use the programs. DPMA suggested that
such licenses are a form of intangible property. Equitable contended
that the predominant purpose or essence of the transaction governed
classification of the sale as involving either tangible or intangible prop
erty. The purpose in the transfer of computer programs via magnetic
tape is to obtain the intangible program, rather than the tangible tape.
Assuming its position, Equitable supported itself with an overwhelm
ing numerical majority of reported cases which applied tax statutes
restricted to tangible personal property.139
Holding for the Comptroller, the court concluded that Equitable
acquired tangible personal property (magnetic tapes), which had been
enhanced in value by the copies of the programs coded thereon. Fur
thermore, it concluded the licenses did not grant intangible rights
from the proprietors to Equitable. They simply erected contractual
limitations on the use which Equitable might otherwise have made of
the statutorily unprotected program copies it acquired. l40
Equitable's principal argument as detailed by the Court of Ap
peals of Maryland, was that the court should conceptually sever the
program copy contained on the magnetic tape from the tangible tape
itself. 141 The above argument is premised on the assumption that the
transaction should be viewed on two operational levels. 142 First, the
transfer of intangible knowledge or information. 143 Second, the deliv
ery of a tangible tape. 144 This "legal surgery" 145 requires Maryland, as
part of its sales tax law, to adopt the principle that the buyer's pre
dominant purpose for a transaction controls the classification of the
acquisition as either tangible or intangible. 146
139.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

suggested
146.

Id. at 466, 464 A.2d at 252.
Id. at 468, 464 A.2d at 253.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The Court of Appeals of Maryland elaborated on this colorful metaphor. It
the need for a "scalpel" to complete this "legal surgery." Id.
Id.
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In its analysis, the Equitable court considered Quotron Sys. v.
Comptroller. 147 In Quotron, the court recognized a predominant pur
pose test as one of several factors in determining use tax applicability
to the type of transaction presented. 148 Quotron Systems undertook
concurrently to render two types of interrelated performances. 149 One
was to maintain and to continuously update a computerized data bank
of economic information. ISO The other was to install Quotron-owned
hardware, including the remote terminals, on its customers' premises
for its use in requesting and receiving electronic transmissions of the
economic data. In Quotron, the court held that the first analytical step
was to characterize the performance as a single, overall function as
either the rental of equipment or the provision of services. lSI The
dominant purpose was to obtain services and not to rent hardware.
Based on that factor, on the taxpayer's retention of control over the
hardware, and on the fact that Quotron's hardware could not be ob
tained without subscribing to the service, the court concluded that the
transaction was the provision of services. ls2 The Equitable court rec
ognized that this approach was quite similar to the approach it used to
determine whether a contract of sale was one for goods or for services
under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, where the perform
ance involved elements of both.ls3
The rule in Quotron was applied implicitly to an undisputed as
pect of Equitable. ls4 In addition to providing program copies on tape,
each licensor agreed to furnish certain installation services. ISS One li
censor also contracted to furnish a limited amount of training within
the fixed contract price. IS6
The "dominant purpose" test of whether the property in question
is being purchased for its own sake or for the intangible information
contained therein can also be applied, according to the Equitable
147. Id. (citing Quotron Sys. v. Comptroller, 287 Md. 178,411 A.2d 439 (1980».
148. Equitable, 296 Md. at 468-69, 464 A.2d at 253.
149. Id.
ISO. Id. The economic information maintained in the computerized data bank in
cluded the selling price of securities which its customers could randomly access through
remote terminals. Id.
151. Id. at 469, 464 A.2d at 253.
152. Id.
153. [d. (citing Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 295 Md. 285,455 A.2d 434 (1983); Bur
ton v. Artery Co., 279 Md. 94, 367 A.2d 935 (1977». "Quotron did not say that the domi
nant purpose of obtaining data made the subject of the contract intangible because
information is intangible." Equitable, 269 Md. at 469, 464 A.2d at 253..
154. Equitable, 269 Md. at 469, 464 A.2d at 253.
ISS. [d.
156. [d.
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court, by analogy to books, motion picture films, video display discs,
phonorecords, and music tapes. 157 The consumer's dominant purpose
in purchasing these items is ordinarily to obtain the knowledge, infor
mation, or data thereby conveyed. 158 Books are generally contained in
a human readable form, while the other media are strictly machine
readable. 159 A purchase of any of these information conveying media
is within the imposition of the sales tax as tangible personal prop
erty.l60 Such transactions escape taxation only if there is an applicable
statutory exclusion or exemption. 161 These analogies, however, have
been argued to other courts which have held that tape copies of pro
grams are intangible. 162
In Equitable, the court rejected the rationale behind the long line
of cases that held taped copies to be intangible. 163 This rejection, it
explained, stemmed from alleged "misconceptions in the technological
underpinnings" of these decisions, and from the "apparent departures
in reasoning from that usually applied in sales tax cases."lM Second,
the court questioned whether District of Columbia v. Universal Com
puter Assoc., Inc. 165 was consistent with Maryland law. 166
Furthermore, the Equitable court concluded a "tape containing a
copy of a canned program does not lose its tangible character because
its content is a reproduction of the product of intellectual effort"
which is placed on the tangible tape, similar to that of a pho
norecord. 167 A phonorecord does not become intangible merely be
cause it is a reproduction of the product of artistic effort. 168 "The
price paid for a copy of a canned program reflects the cost of develop
ing the program."169 The proprietor hopes to recover such costs, with
profit, by spreading its costs among its customers. 170 The program
tape is not made less tangible merely because the canned program
157. Id. at 470, 464 A.2d at 254.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 481, 464 A.2d at 259.
164. Id.
165. 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Universal Computer Assoc. established the first
decision in a line of program-labeling precedent. Id.
166. Equitable, 296 Md. at 481, 464 A.2d at 259.
167. Id. at 484, 464 A.2d at 261.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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placed on the tape is more expensive than the typical phonorecord. 171
The court stated that Equitable's intangibility argument would
have merit
if the direct input by keyboard, without documentation, alternative
(a service transaction) or the electronic transmission, without docu
mentation, alternative (no tangible carrier) is the form of transac
tion under consideration. But, because a taxable transaction might
have been structured in a nontaxable form, it does not thereby be
come nontaxable. 172

Equitable also argued that a purchased program "can be and was
in fact severed and exists apart from the tangible transfer medium
. . . . "173 The copy delivered to Equitable, however, did not become
severed in any physical sense from the tape when the tape was used to
structure the computer memory.174
The court did "not discern any legally significant difference, for
sales tax purposes between the canned computer program on magnetic
tape and music on a phonograph record."17S The court quoted the
Final Report of the Commission on New Technological Uses of Copy
righted Works: "Both recorded music and computer programs are sets
of information in a form which, when passed over a magnetized head,
cause minute currents to flow in such a way that desired physical work
is accomplished."176 In the case of the phonograph record, the Mary
land sales tax statute was never "viewed as conceptually severing the
copy of the performance from the tangible carrier."177 The court con
cluded that "the statute does not sever copies of computer programs
from the tangible carriers employed in the subject sales." 178
Chittenden Trust Co. v. Kingl79 was decided by the Supreme
Court of Vermont the day after Equitable was decided. InKing, "the
Department of Taxes (Department) assessed a compensating use tax of
$471 against the Chittenden Trust Company (Bank) for the purchase
171.

Id.
Id. This fonn over substance argument was also adopted by the court in Chit
tenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983).
173. Equitable, 296 Md. at 485, 464 A.2d at 261.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 40 at 10.
177. Equitable, 296 Md. at 485, 464 A.2d at 261.
178. Id.
179. 143 Vt. 271,465 A.2d 1100 (1983). The Supreme Court of South Carolina has
recently detennined that the sale of computer software is the sale of tangible personal prop
erty. See Citizens and Southern Sys., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm., Opinion No.
22024 (Filed Jan. 10, 1984).
172.
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of a 'canned' software tape valued at $15,700."180 The Department
classified the tape as tangible personal property subject to taxation.
The Bank contended the tape was intangible and therefore exempt
from the tax. 181
Chittenden Trust purchased the program in the form of a mag
netic tape. 182 The programming information, according to the court,
could have been carried by other means, including punch cards, tele
phone lines, and personal programming. 183 The court concluded
[t]he fifteen to twenty "man-years" required to develop the "off the
shelP' program accounted for most of its total value, since a blank
magnetic tape may be purchased for approximately $15. Once the
information was transferred into the computer's memory, the tape
was of negligible value to the Bank, and may be reused, destroyed or
returned to its original distributor. l84

The court, holding for the Department, concluded that the com
puter tape was tangible personal property and, therefore, its sale was
subject to taxation. The court cited the applicable Vermont Statute
which provides the following definition of tangible personal property:
[P]ersonal property which may be seen, weighed, measured, felt,
touched or in any other manner perceived by the senses and shall
include fuel and electricity, but shall not include rights and credits,
insurance policies, bills of exchange, stocks and bonds and similar
evidences of indebtedness or ownership.18s

In holding that the computer tape was tangible personal property,
the court noted that the tape could be seen, weighed, measured, and
touched. The tape was not a right or credit. 186 The court rejected the
Bank's contention that the "focus of the transaction" was the transfer
of intangible knowledge and information, rather than the tangible
magnetic tape, because the purchase of an "off the shelf" program
does not involve the sale of personal services. It involves the sale of
tangible personal property.187
The court also rejected the Bank's attempts to distinguish a com
puter program tape from other taxable personal property such as
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
(1981).
186.
187.

Chittenden Trust Co., 143 Vt. at 272, 465 A.2d at 1100.
Id. at 273, 465 A.2d at 1101.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 273-74, 465 A.2d at 1102. See a/so VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 9701(7)
Chittenden Trust Co., 143 Vt. at 273-74, 465 A.2d at 1102.
Id. at 274, 465 A.2d at 1102.
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films, videotapes, books, cassettes, and records. Its reasoning was that
the value of each "lies in their respective abilities to store and later
display or transmit their contents."188 A computer software tape, the
court concluded, is no different. 189 Specifically, the court stated:
It may well be that the Bank could have procured, by way of tele
phone or personal service, the same programming information so as
to avoid a use tax .. To base the tax consequences of a transaction on
how it could have been structured 'would require rejection of the
established tax principle that a transaction is to be given its tax ef
fect in accord with what actually occurred and not in accord with
what might have occurred.' . . . This we will not do. The Bank
must accept the consequences of its choice to purchase the program
in the form of a tape. 190

It will take some time to determine whether the decisions in Equi
table and Chittenden are aberrations or the birth of a trend. Many
state legislatures have adopted statutes that classify canned and cus
tom software as either tangible or intangible. Several states, however,
have not yet addressed the tangibility issue as it relates to software.
As technology advances, some states may reexamine their position on
software. Future decisions may be influenced by Equitable and
Chittenden.
VII.
A.

FEDERAL TAXATION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE

The Investment Tax Credit 191

Computer hardware qualifies for the investment tax credit. 192
Therefore, computer software, in certain instances, may also qualify
for the investment tax credit. Revenue Procedure 69-21 addresses the
software issue. 193 It defines computer software to include:
[A]ll programs or routines used to cause a computer to perform a
desired task or set of tasks, and the documentaion required to de
scribe and maintain those programs. Computer programs of all
classes, for example, operating systems, executive systems,
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. (quoting Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417
U.S. 134.148 (1974».
191. The Internal Revenue Service is currently drafting proposed regulations that. if
adopted. would classify software as intangible and therefore ineligible for the investment
tax credit. See Accelerated Cost Recovery System. 49 Fed. Reg. 5939-5941 (1984).
192. The investment tax credit rules are covered in I.R.C. §§ 38 - 50 (1980). and
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.38-1 (1979) - 1.50 (1984).
193. Rev. Proc. 69-21. 1969-2 C.B. 303.
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monitors, compilers and translators, assembly routines, and utility
programs as well as application programs are included. "Computer
software" does not include procedures which are external to com
puter operations, such as instructions to transcription operators and
external control procedures. 194

This revenue procedure specifically permits a taxpayer consist
ently either to expense software development costs or to amortize
them over five years or less, similar to research and experimental ex
penditures. 195 Purchased software costs that are included in the price
of hardware, and are not separately stated, are treated as tangible.
They may be amortized over five years or less. Software that is leased
for use in a trade or business may be deducted in accordance with
Regulation 1.162-11}96 An Internal Revenue Service Revenue Rul
ing 197 allows the investment credit to be taken for software, the cost of
which is included in the cost of the hardware. If software develop
ment costs have been expensed in prior years and the taxpayer capital
izes software costs incurred for a new software project, the IRS will
consider the practice to be a change in accounting method and require
approval. 198
The IRS treats software that is separately priced as intangible
property. Therefore, it does not qualify for the investment tax credit.
Many state courts also treat software as intangible for sales, use, and
property tax purposes.1 99 Three recently decided state tax cases held,
however, that software is tangible for sales2°O and use201 tax purposes.
These three decisions are diametrically opposed to the weight of judi
cial precedent.
At least one case, Hancock v. State,202 has held software to be
tangible for criminal law purposes. In Hancock, a Texas man stole
several computer programs from his employer. He claimed that he
had committed petty larceny, rather than grand larceny, because the
only tangible property he stole was the paper on which the programs
194. Id. at § 2.
195. I.R.C. § 174 (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.174 (1984).
196. See supra note 7.
197. Rev. Rul. 71-177, 1971-1 C.B. 5.
198. Rev. Rul. 71-248, 1971-1 C.B. 55.
199. See supra notes 55-107 and accompanying text.
200. Comptroller ofthe Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248
(1983).
201. Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983). See also
Citizens and Southern Sys., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 280 S.C. 138, 311 S.E.2d
717 (1984).
202. 402 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
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were printed. The value of the paper, he argued, was less than fifty
dollars. The court disagreed, holding that the programs had a value in
excess of the paper on which they were printed. The court concluded
that tangible property, for purposes of the criminal statute, was
stolen.203
In Computer Sciences Corp. v. Commissioner,204 computer
software was held to be intangible for collapsible corporation205 pur
poses. In that case, Computax, a wholly owned subsidiary of Com
puter Sciences Corporation, owned a program for the computer
preparation of income tax returns. The Commissioner argued that a
collapsible corporation has been established to avoid tax liability.
Computer Sciences Corporation claimed that property manufactured,
constructed, or produced (such as the Computax program) was not
intended to apply to intangible property of any type. 206 If the section
was designed to be applied to intangible property, Computer Sciences
Corporation argued that no such intangible property was produced
since all that it produced and developed for transfer to Computax was
"know-how" and "goodwill," not "property."
Other court cases have addressed the tangibility issue for motion
picture film negatives and software. In the first of a series of Walt
Disney cases,207 the issues included whether motion picture film nega
tives were tangible personal property for federal tax purposes, and
whether the motion picture film negatives qualified for the investment
tax credit.
The district court held that the mature film negatives were tangi
ble personal property for federal tax purposes. It held further that the
master motion picture film negatives used in the film manufacturing
process were tangible personal property within the meaning of the In
ternal Revenue Code of 1954. 208 They had a useful life of more than
eight years, they were depreciable, and they were eligible for the in
vestment tax credit. 209 The Commissioner contended that the nega
203. Id. at 91l.
204. 63 T.C 327 (1974).
205. I.R.C. § 341(b)(2) (1982).
206. I.R.C § 341; Treas. Reg. § 1.341-1 (1979).
207. Walt Disney Productions v. United States (Disney I), 327 F. Supp. 189 (CD.
Cal. 1971), affd. as modified, 480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934
(1974). The Disney I holding has since been codified at I.R.C. § 48(K) (1982) as a result of
the Tax Reform Act of 1976. The rationale of this case, however, continues to provide
strong support for the tangibility of computer software. See Disney I, 327 F. Supp. at 191
92.
208. Disney I, 327 F.Supp at 192.
209. Id. at 190.
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tives were not tangible personal property within the meaning of IRC
Section 48(a)(I)(A)21O and that they did not have a useful life of eight
years. Therefore, the Commissioner contended they could not qualify
for the investment tax credit.
Film negatives are used to make prints. The prints are copy
righted and exhibited in theaters or on television. The negatives, how
ever, are not copyrighted. The Commissioner argued that all labor
and production costs of the negatives must be attributed to the copy
righted prints.
The court held for Walt Disney Productions. 211 Motion picture
film negatives were considered tangible personal property, notwith
standing Reg. 1.48-1(£)212 which the court determined was invalid.
The negatives in question had a useful life sufficiently long to qualify
for the investment credit. 213 Film negatives, like production machin
ery, are standardized units of depreciable property which Disney used
to produce the positive prints. The Commissioner's attribution of the
entire value of the film to the copyright was unwarranted. The court
analogized such attribution to a situation in which the entire value of a
machine used in production is attributed to a patent. 214
A third Disney case215 further addressed the film negative tangi
bility issue. In this case, Walt Disney Productions sued for a tax re
fund. It claimed the investment tax credit under 26 U.S.C. Sections
38, 46-50 (1970) for the cost of numerous film negatives produced by
the company in 1970. The district court ordered the government to
make the refund and the government appealed.
Disney sought the investment tax credit for the production costs
of the "master negative" from which positive prints are ultimately pro
duced. 216 Disney, in calculating its credit, claimed "all the capitalized
costs necessary to produce the master negative."217 Disney did not
210. Id. at 191. I.R.C. § 48(a)(I)(A) (1982) states in pertinent part: "[Investment
tax credit] property means tangible personal property." Id.
211. Disney I, 327 F.Supp at 193.
212. Id. at 191-92.
213. Id. at 190-91.
214. Id. at 191-92.
215. Walt Disney Productions v. United States (Disney III), 549 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.
1977).
216. Id. at 578-80. The "masternegative" has two distinct components, an edited,
negative version of the film itself ("cut-picture negative"), and a magnetic tape version of
the soundtrack ("magnetic master sound tape"). Id. at 578-79. The audio is then con
verted from magnetic tape to transparent film ("optical sound negative"), while the visual
footage is passed through its own intermediate production stage. At this stage the audio
and visual components are referred to collectively as "completion negatives." Id.
217. Id. at 580. These costs were for the script, the actors' salaries, the set construc
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claim the costs incurred in producing the "completion negatives," nor
did it claim as investment credit property the unmixed dialogue, mu
sic, or sound effect tapes, although the expense for those items was
claimed in computing the overall production costs of the master
negative. 218
The depreciable base used by Disney accountants included the
capitalized costs of producing answer prints. 219 The court described
the income-forecast method used by Disney to depreciate each film
title as the method "generally used for depreciating intangible per
sonal property. "220
Disney had claimed an investment tax credit amounting to seven
percent of its qualified investment in the master negatives it had pro
duced in 1970. The Commissioner ruled the costs were an investment
in an intangible property and refused to recognize the investment tax
credit. 221 The government took the position that, while a master nega
tive was "tangible" in that it consists of film stock and tape, the
tangibles, by themselves, were nothing and had no depreciation bases
for tax purposes apart from intangible rights included in the finished
product. 222 The court held that the master negatives were indeed tan
gible property, even though the bulk of their value came from intangi
ble rights. 223
The government next argued that since Disney had treated the
property in question as intangible for depreciation purposes, the prop
erty must also be considered as intangible (and therefore not eligible)
for investment tax credit purposes. 224 According to the court,
[t]he government contended that even if Disney's production costs
could qualify for the credit, .a portion of the credit allowed for prior
taxable years was subject to recapture because the motion pictures
involved were exhibited predominantly outside the United States in
1970. In that year, more than 50 percent of Disney's gross receipts
from exhibition of prints produced from 1962-69 master negatives
tion, as well as the cost of editing and mixing the original negatives and audio tapes to
produce a "cut-picture" negative and master sound tape. Id. at 580 n.2.
218. Id. at 581.
219. Id. at 580. This included the costs of the optical sound negatives but excluded
the costs of the intermediate visual stage. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 582.
223. Id. at 580-81. The court pointed out that it had previously reached the same
conclusion in Disney I and Disney II. Id. at 580.
224. Id. at 581.
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came from foreign sources. 225
The court held for Disney on three major points. First, master
negatives used in the film manufacturing process were held to be tangi
ble property for investment tax credit purposes. 226 Second, the full
seven percent credit could be claimed because the negatives had a suffi
ciently long useful life. 227 Third, the fact that the motion pictures in
volved were exhibited outside the United States in 1970 did not subject
a portion of the investment tax credit allowed for prior taxable years
to recapture. 228
The decision reached in Disney III is consistent with Disney l. In
Disney III the court draws an analogy between a master negative and a
machine that stamps out patented products for sale. 229 The stamping
machine is tangible even though the product it produces is protected
by an intangible copyright. The same is true of master film nega
tives. 23o Legislative history, discussed in detail in Texas Instruments,
Inc. v. United States,231 also indicates that it was the intent of Con
gress that items such as the master film negatives be treated as tangible
property qualifying for the investment tax credit. 232
In Disney III, the court relied on Treasury Regulation Section
1.48-1(g)(I)(i) which provides that property physically located outside
the United States during more than fifty percent of the year shall be
considered used predominantly outside the United States. 233 Such
property is therefore ineligible for the investment tax credit. The
master negatives (upon which the investment tax credit was claimed)
remained in the United States throughout 1970. Only the exhibition
prints left the country. The investment tax credit was not claimed on
them. Therefore, no investment tax credit need be recaptured. 234
The court also held that even though the property in question
may be treated as intangible for depreciation purposes, such treatment
does not preclude tangible treatment for purposes of the investment
tax credit. Three other cases have addressed this same issue,235 and
have reached the same conclusion.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 582.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 580-81.
Id. at 582.
Disney I, 327 F.Supp. at 192; Disney Ill, 549 F.Supp. at 578.
Disney Ill, 549 F. Supp. at 581.
407 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd in part, 551 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977).
Disney III, 549 F.2d at 582.
Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(g)(I)(i) (1964).
Disney Ill, 549 F.2d at 582.
The following three cases were heard together on appeal. Bing Crosby Produc
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In Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States,236 the court addressed
the issue of whether computer tapes, including the value of the data
contained therein, are considered tangible personal property for in
vestment tax credit and depreciation purposes. During 1968 and
1969, a subsidiary of Texas Instruments was
engaged in the business of collecting, processing and selling or li
censing offshore seismic information to various customers who, in
tum, used that information to explore for oil and gas. While the
information was furnished to the customer in picture form depicting
the contours of the earth's different strata, the actual collection and
editing process involved a complicated computer process. 237

Seismic data were transmitted by electronic impulses and tran
scribed onto magnetic computer tapes known as "field" tapes. From
these field tapes, a "final" or "output" tape was produced. The pic
tures were then produced from the final tape. 238
When a customer placed an order for the information, according
to the court, he received a copy of the original picture produced by the
process, a map locating the points where the sound waves were intro
duced into the earth, and a report outlining the conditions under
which the tests were conducted. The Texas Instruments subsidiary
company retained all field and output tapes as well as the original ana
log film. Information furnished on the picture to customers was li
censed on a non-exclusive basis. Customers were generally not
permitted to make the data available to others. 239
Costs incurred in 1968 and 1969 were in excess of $3,000,000,
and were deducted by the taxpayer as ordinary and necessary business
expenses. The Internal Revenue Service disallowed these deductions
and determined that the costs should be capitalized and amortized
over a seven year period. 240 Texas Instruments did not dispute this
determination, but insisted that it was entitled to an investment tax
credit and to use the double-declining balance method of depreciation
on the total capitalized costs of the field tapes, output tapes, and ana
log film.241 The IRS contended that these tax benefits were applicable
only to the cost of the raw tape and film itself, not to the full cost of
tions, Inc. v. United States; Sussex Pictures, Inc. v. United States; and University City
Studios, Inc. v. United States, 588 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1979).
236. 551 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977).
237. Id. at 608.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 608-09.
240. Id. at 609.
241. Id.
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producing the tapes and film.242
At the district court level,243 the government's position was sus
tained on two grounds. First, when a taxpayer places into service tan
gible personal property that it produced itself, the investment tax
credit may be taken only for the costs of the tangible inputs used. La
bor and other intangible costs must be excluded. Since Texas Instru
ments failed to allocate its costs between the tangible and intangible
inputs, no investment tax credit may be claimed. 244 Second, the costs
incurred in producing and processing the seismic data on the tapes
and film did not constitute making an investment in tangible property,
but rather intangible information. 245
On appeal, the government conceded that the district court's
analysis on the first ground was erroneous. It sought to sustain the
district court's judgment on the second ground, however, arguing that
the capital asset in which the taxpayer's costs are invested is essen
tially intangible. Therefore, all costs of acquiring or producing that
asset constituted the basis of an intangible asset; the investment tax
credit and the double declining balance method of depreciation were
unavailable. 246
On appeal, the court held for Texas Instruments. 241 Treasury
Regulation Section 1.48-1(F) states:
Intangible property, such as patents, copyrights, and SUbscription
lists, does not qualify as section 38 property. The cost of intangible
property, in the case of a patent or copyright, includes all costs of
purchasing or producing the item patented or copyrighted. Thus, in
the case of a motion picture or television film or tape, the cost of
the intangible property includes manuscript and screenplay costs,
the cost of wardrobe and set design, the salaries of cameramen, ac
tors, directors, etc., and all other costs properly includible in the
basis of such film or tape. 248

Treasury regulations, the court recognized, are ordinarily entitled
to considerable weight in construing the statutory language. 249 The
court pointed out, however, that the Ninth Circuit had previously
242.
243.
244.

245.
246.
247.
248.

249.

Id
Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States, 407 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
Id. at 1341-42.
Id.
Texas Instruments, 551 F.2d at 609.
Id. at 610-11.
Treas. Reg. § l.48-1(F) (1983).
Texas Instruments, 551 F.2d at 610.
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ruled the regulation to be invalid as applied to film.250 The Texas In
struments court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's decision.2S1 When
Congress reenacted the investment tax credit in 1971, it expressly indi
cated its agreement with the Disney I holding that motion pictures and
television films are tangible personal property, eligible for the invest
ment credit,252 Furthermore, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 added Sec
tion 48(k) to the Internal Revenue Code, and treats motion picture
and television films as tangible personal property eligible for the in
vestment tax credit. 253
In Texas Instruments, the court held that the property in question
was tangible personal property and therefore qualified for the invest
ment tax credit and for the use of the double declining balance method
of depreciation. For investment tax credit and depreciation purposes,
the basis of tangible tapes and films on which the taxpayer recorded
seismic data included the cost of collecting the data and recording it
on the raw tapes and films.
B.

The Credit for Research and Experimental Expenditures

As a general rule, business expenditures to develop or create an
asset which has a useful life that extends beyond the current taxable
year, such as expenditures to develop a new consumer product or to
improve a production process, must normally be capitalized. They
cannot be deducted in the year that they are paid or incurred. Such
product development costs are usually recovered only on disposition
or abandonment of the asset, or through depreciation or amortization
deductions taken over the useful life of the asset.
Internal Revenue Code Section 174, however, permits a taxpayer
to elect special tax accounting methods for certain research or experi
mental expenditures which are paid or incurred during the taxable
year in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business. 254 Under
section 174, a taxpayer may elect to deduct currently the amount of
qualified research or experimental expenditures, or to deduct those ex
penditures ratably over the useful life of the property or a period of
250. Id. (citing Walt Disney Productions v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 189 (D.C.
Cal. 1971), affd on appeal, 480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934 (1974».
251. Texas Instruments, 551 F.2d at 610.
252. S. Rep. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1971), reprinted in, 1971 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News, 1918.
253. See also Treas. Reg. § 7.48-1(a) (1983).
254. I.R.C. § 174(a)(I) (1984). The Internal Revenue Code permits taxpayers to
"treat research or experimental expenditures which are paid or incurred during the taxable
year in connection with [a] trade or business as expenses which are not chargeable to [a]
capital account." Id. "The expenditures so treated shall be allowed as a deduction." Id.

700

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:651

sixty months, whichever is less. A taxpayer may choose either method
of deduction treatment provided it is consistent. Furthermore, this
special method of tax accounting for research or experimental expend
itures does not have to be consistent with the method the taxpayer
uses to compute its income in keeping its books. Thus, a taxpayer
may, for tax purposes, elect to deduct currently the amount of re
search or experimental expenditures, even if such expenses are treated
as capital account charges or deferred expenses on the taxpayer's
books or financial statements. Section 174 does not specifically define
the "research and development costs in the experimental or laboratory
sense. "255
Since 1969, the Internal Revenue Service has taken the position
that taxpayers may treat costs incurred in developing new or improved
computer software in a manner similar to costs incurred in product
development. Such costs generally fall under section 174. As a result,
many computer services companies have elected to treat their software
research and development expenses under section 174 and either de
duct those expenses currently, or, where it appears more advantageous
from a tax standpoint, amortize those expenses over five years or less.
The Internal Revenue Service has not, however, expressly stated that
software development costs are within the scope of "qualified re
search" under Section 174.
The research credit is designed to encourage businesses to in
crease the amounts they spend on research and experimental activities.
The credit is equal to twenty-five percent of the increase in research
expenses for the year over average research expenses during an earlier
base period. 256 The research credit can be taken for research expendi
tures incurred after June 30, 1981, and before January 1, 1986. 257
255. Id.
256. I.R.C. § 44F(a) (1984). See also I.R.C. § 174 (1984); the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221(a), 95 stat. 241 (1981), reprinted in, 1981 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 172,241.
257. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, Sec. 221(a) (codified
as 26 U.S.C. § 44F (1983». This period may be extended by pending legislation. On Janu
ary 21,1983, proposed regulations were issued that, if adopted, would place more stringent
restrictions on software than on other types of research and experimental expenditures. 48
Fed. Reg. 2799 (1983)(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.174-2(a)(3». As a result of subs tan
tial public outcry, the proposed regulations have been withdrawn for further drafting. See
Yost, A Survey 0/ Tax Issues Affecting Software Developers and Users, TAX EXECUTIVE
120,128-33 (1984); Arthur Andersen & Co., Research and Development, Washington Tax
Letter, Sept. 23, 1983, at 3; letter from Arthur Young & Co. to Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (March 25, 1983)(discussing proposed regulations on credit for increasing re
search activity-internal revenue code sections 44F and 174); letter from Arthur Young &
Co. to Commissioner of Internal Revenue (March 16, 1983)(discussing proposed treasury
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A Controversy

In 1981, Congress expressed its concern over the decline of this
nation's research and development activities and the reluctance of
many businesses to expand significantly their research investment, ab
sent tax incentives. Congress enacted a credit for increased research
and experimental expenditures. The new credit258 gives a direct re
duction in bottom line tax liability for incremental increases in quali
fied research expenses. In other words, the excess of qualifying
current year expenses over average base period expenses. 259 This
credit equals twenty-five percent of the excess (if any) of the taxpayer's
average "qualified research expenses" for the taxable year over the tax
payer's average qualified research expenses in a base period (one year,
two years, or three years).
On January 21, 1983, the Treasury Department issued proposed
regulations 260 that, if adopted, would provide guidance for the imple
mentation of section 44F. Due to public outcry, the proposed regula
tions have been recalled for further drafting. As drafted, the proposed
regulations would have set separate, and more strict, standards for
software development than for other research activities. This stricter
standard would have precluded software expenditures from qualifying
for the research credit unless the software project was virtually guar
anteed to fail from the start, because operational feasibility of a pro
gram must be seriously in doubt before costs of development could be
regulation section 1.174-2(a)(3) and (4»; Barres, Tracking the Accounting and Taxation
Methods of the Computer Software Industry,(1984)(unpublished M.B.A. thesis, New York
University); Barry, Goldstein & Brehmer, Proposed Regs. on the Credit for Research and
Experimental Expenditures: An Analysis, 59 J. TAX'N 76,76-83 (1983); Black & Reese, The
Taxation of Computer Technology, 14 THE TAX ADVISOR 84,84-97 (1983); Computer and
Business Equipment Manufacturers Assoc., Computer Industry Leaders Declare IRS Vio
lating Congressional Intent on Software Regulations, Industry News, April 7, 1983; Com
puter-Software Developers Find Hope in the Research - Credit Dispute, Wall St. J., April 27,
1983, at 1, col. 1; Hershey, Computer Tax Rules Assailed, N. Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1983, at
D2, col. 1; Damsky, Integration of the Section 44F Research Tax Credit into The Research
Investment Venture, 61 TAXES 127 (1983); Feinschreiber, Defining Research for Purposes
ofthe Research Credit, 35 TAX EXECUTIVE 159 (1983); IRS Proposals on R&D are Inade
quate High Tech Incentive, Entrepreneur, August, 1983, at 32; Silversmith, Tax Credit for
Increasing Research Activities, 69 A.B.A.J. 90, 90-93 (1983); Wasserman, Section 174 and
Computer Software Development, 61 TAXES 506, 512 (1983); Wilkins, IRS Seeks to Elimi
nate Software Tax Credits, Management Information Systems Week, April 20, 1983, at 20;
McGee, Software Taxation: A New NAA Research Study, MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING
70,70-71,77 (1984).
258. 26 U.S.C. § 44F(1983).
259. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221(a)(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 44F (1983».
260. Amendments to § 1.174-2, 48 Fed. Reg. 2790 (1983)(to be codified at 26 C.F.R.
Part 1 § 1.174-2). See supra note 257.
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considered for the research credit. The costs associated with generat
ing programs using standard programming techniques would therefore
not qualify for the credit.
As stated in the proposed regulations, the costs of generating pro
grams using standard programming techniques would not qualify for
the research credit even if such costs were part of a project that other
wise qualified for the credit. For example, the research costs associ
ated with developing a cure for arthritis would qualify for the research
credit, but any software costs associated with the project would not
qualify if standard programming techniques were employed. Setting a
separate and higher standard for software is a radical departure from
. the current practice. Such a double standard violates congressional
intent.
D.

Congressional Intent

When Congress passed Public Law No. 97-34, it was with the
intent that computer software development costs would qualify for the
research credit. According to the Republican Senator from Kansas,
Robert Dole,
[W]ages incurred in developing new or significantly improved com
puter software and which presently may be treated in a manner sim
ilar to section 174 research or experimental expenditures are
intended to qualify for the new research credit, provided that they
also meet the requirements of new section 44F which are added to
the requirements of section 174 and provided they are not subject to
the specific exclusions of new section 44F.26\

The House Ways and Means Committee indicated a similar
intent:
[E]xpenditures which otherwise would qualify for the new credit are
not to be disqualified solely because such costs are incurred in devel
oping computer "software," rather than in developing
"hardware. "262

E.

Treasury Department Misinterpretation

By drafting regulations that set a separate and more strict stan
dard for software development than for other research activities, the
Treasury has misinterpreted congressional intent. 263 Sections 174 and
261.
262.
263.

127 CoNG. REC. S 8109 (daily ed. July 21, 1981)(statement of Sen. Dole).
H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1981).
Proposed Regulation 1.174-2,48 F.R. 2790 (1983).
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44F share a common definition of "research." Certain research ex
penditures that qualify for the section 174 deduction election do not
qualify for the research credit. For example, research expenditures
may qualify under section 174 if paid or incurred in connection with
taxpayer's trade or ousiness.~o.t These same research expenditures,
however, will not qualify for the research credit unless paid or in
curred in maintaining a trade or business. 26s Furthermore, expendi
tures incurred to conduct research outside the United States may
qualify for deduction under section 174, but do not qualify for the
research credit. 266 In addition, expenditures that do not qualify for
deduction under section 174 are not eligible for the research credit. 267
The Internal Revenue Service has officially proclaimed that the
proposed regulations 268 are in accord with congressional intent. Ac
cording to the IRS, that intent is recorded by the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation. 269 Staff explanations do not constitute offi
ciallegislative history. They are, however, sometimes used as persua
sive authority.27o In this instance, the Staff has clearly misconstrued
congressional intent.
The Staff explanation was drawn from two principal sources: the
House Ways and Means Committee Report 271 and the Senate Finance
Committee Report. 272 These reports addressed separate and different
research credit proposals. Portions of both reports were eventually
incorporated into the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
(ERTA);273 but only after amendment and a series of compromises.
The original House proposa}274 contained a definition of "re
search" that was derived from the Financial Accounting Standards
Board's definition of "research and development."27s The FASB defi
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

I.R.C. § 174(a)(1) (1982).
I.R.C. § 44F(b)(I) (1982).
I.R.C. § 44F(d)(I) (1982).
Proposed Regulation 1.44 F-4, 48 F.R. 2790 (1983).
Proposed Regulation 1.174-2,48 F.R. 2790 (1983).
269. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANA
TION FOR THE EcONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 117-137 (issued Dec. 31,1981).
270. H.R. REP. No. 215, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. 223-24 reprinted in 105 U.S. Code &
Ad. News 313-14 (1981).
271. H.R. REP. No. 201 at 109.
272. S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. 75 reprinted in 105 U.S. Code & Ad.
News 180-82 (1981).
273. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221, 95 Stat. 172, 241-247 reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code
Congo & Ad. News 172,241-47 (1981).
274. "Tax Incentive Act of 1981," H.R. 4242, 97th Cong. Ist. Sess. § 241.
275. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement No.2, "Accounting for Re
search and Development Costs" (1974).
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nition was not intended to be controlling for purposes of the research
credit. 276 The House Ways and Means definition, which was not
adopted, did not contain any cross reference to Section 174 "research
and experimental expenditures" in the definition of "qualified" re
search. Congress preferred broader language to a: detailed definition
and adopted the Senate version instead. Originally, the Senate propo
sal addressed only wage expenditures, but other costs were subse
quently addressed. In the version that was finally adopted by
Congress, "qualified research" was given the same general meaning as
"research or experimental in section 174."277
Because the Senate version was adopted, the Ways and Means
definition should not receive much weight. The House Ways and
Means Committee intended to have software costs included in quali
fied research expenditures, and the Committee stated specifically that
such costs should be included. 278

276.
277.
278.

H.R. Rep. No. 201 at 111 n.3.
I.R.C. § 44F(d) (1982).
H.R. REP. No. 201 at 114.

